D.C. Circuit Issues Speech or Debate Ruling in the Feeney case

             The D.C. Circuit issued a significant Speech or Debate ruling last month in a case involving former Congressman Tom Feeney.  Feeney had been investigated by the House Ethics Committee for accepting a privately financed trip which allegedly violated House Rules because it was paid for by a lobbyist and/or was “substantially recreational in nature.”   

            After the ethics investigation was closed, federal prosecutors began looking into the matter.  Grand jury subpoenas were issued to Feeney’s lawyers seeking information about the statements that Feeney had made to the Ethics Committee (although it is not clear from the opinion, it appears that the investigation may have focused on whether these statements were truthful).  Feeney and his lawyers moved to quash the subpoenas based on the Speech or Debate Clause.  The district court denied the motion, holding that “the congressman was not acting in his legislative capacity but in his personal capacity as a witness to facts relevant to the Committee’s investigation.” 

            At first glance, the district court’s conclusion would appear to be well-supported by the D.C. Circuit’s decision in United States v. Rose, 28 F.3d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1994).  Rose involved a congressman who was sued by the Justice Department for filing false financial disclosure statements that failed to disclose personal loans he had received from his campaign and other sources.  The suit relied upon the congressman’s testimony before the House Ethics Committee, which had previously investigated the same issue.  The court rejected the argument that this use of the testimony violated the Speech or Debate Clause, noting that the congressman’s testimony did not relate to pending legislation but to his handling of personal financial transactions.  It concluded that he “was acting as a witness to facts relevant to a congressional investigation of his private conduct; he was not acting in a legislative capacity.” 

            In reaching this conclusion, however, the Rose court had to distinguish a prior D.C. Circuit decision, Ray v. Proxmire, 581 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1978), which held that a Senator’s letter to the Senate Ethics Committee was protected by Speech or Debate.  In that case, the Senator was responding to allegations that he had misused Senate rooms by reserving them for the use of his wife’s clients.  The Ray court stated that “[i]n responding to a Senate inquiry into an exercise of his official powers, Senator Proxmire was engaged in a matter central to the jurisdiction of the Senate.”  The Rose court seized upon this reference to the Senator’s “official powers,” finding that Rose’s testimony, in contrast, related to personal financial transactions rather than the use of “official powers.” 

            This distinction, however, makes little sense.  In the first place, it is clear that the ethics committee has jurisdiction over alleged improper filings of financial disclosures, and it is difficult to see why such matters are any less “central to the jurisdiction” of the House or Senate than other allegations of improper conduct by Members.  Second, it is not at all obvious how one concludes that misuse of Senate rooms is more “official” than improper filing of financial disclosures.  In the former case, the Member allegedly misused an official power for personal gain, while in the latter the Member allegedly failed to perform an official duty for personal benefit.  Why this makes a difference for purposes of Speech or Debate protection is not explained by the Rose case. 

            The application of this distinction to the facts of the Feeney case is not self-evident either.  The government argued that the ethics investigation concerned a “personal” matter, i.e., Feeney’s receipt of a privately funded vacation in violation of House Rules.  During the course of the ethics investigation, however, Feeney had argued that his trip was for purposes of legislative fact-finding.  The D.C. Circuit found that this contention (whether or not it was true) transformed the investigation into one of whether Feeney had “abused” his official powers in accepting the trip.  It therefore concluded that the case fell on the Ray side of the Ray/Rose line and that Feeney’s statements to the Ethics Committee were protected by Speech or Debate.      

            Given the incoherence of the Ray/Rose distinction, it is difficult to say with assurance whether the Feeney panel applied it correctly.  As Judge Kavanaugh points out in his concurrence, the Ray/Rose test involves “fine slicing of Member’s speech” that engenders confusion and uncertainty.  It is worth noting, however, that the Feeney decision may add even more uncertainty and confusion to this area.  For example, the panel emphasized the fact that “legislative fact-finding” is itself protected by Speech or Debate.  Does this mean that the case would have been decided differently if the alleged official purpose of the trip had been non-legislative (e.g., giving a speech)?  It is also impossible to tell from the decision what the relationship was between the statements that the government sought to subpoena and the alleged legislative purpose of the trip.  Does the mere fact that the ethics investigation involved an issue of legislative fact-finding mean that all of Feeney’s statements are protected by Speech or Debate, even if they related to other subjects (such as whether the trip was funded by a lobbyist)? 

            Judge Kavanaugh proposes eliminating the Ray/Rose distinction and replacing it with a simple rule that all Member statements in congressional disciplinary proceedings are protected by Speech or Debates.  I will discuss this proposal in a future post.  For now I will simply note that there is much force to Kavanaugh’s argument, but it would have very significant implications that need to be carefully considered. 

            Before leaving the main Feeney decision, it should be noted that it could have implications outside the narrow area of subpoenas for statements made to the Ethics Committee.  If the grand jury were investigating whether the privately financed trip constituted a bribe or illegal gratuity, it might be argued, based on the language of this case, that the Speech or Debate Clause prohibits any inquiry into the trip because of the alleged legislative fact-finding purpose.  Whether the holding in fact extends so far will have to await future litigation.

Mort Rosenberg on Congressional Investigations

          Last Thursday, the Constitution Project released a handbook on congressional oversight and investigations authored by the incomparable Mort Rosenberg, who spent more than 35 years at the Congressional Research Service not only learning everything there is to know about congressional oversight of the executive branch but participating in most of the major executive-legislative disputes during that time.  For reasons known only to itself, CRS let him retire, which means that he is now free to share his encyclopedic knowledge with the world.   

The following quote from the book summarizes its purpose: “As the title of this handbook suggests, it is designed to be an introduction to the legislative investigatory process. It is intended to shed some light on this aspect of the arcane, sometimes impenetrable, and often seemingly bizarre “Law of Congress” that can confound the most sophisticated legal practitioners representing government and private clients before an inquiring committee, and which may even elude the members and staff of committees conducting such inquiries. The law of congressional investigation consists of a complex combination of constitutional rulings and principles, statutory provisions, Byzantine internal rules adopted by the House and Senate and individual committees, informal practices, and folkways. Although there is no black letter guide for the uninitiated, we hope that this handbook will provide a first step in that direction.” 

Entitled “When Congress Comes Calling:A Primer on the Principles, Practices, and Pragmatics of Legislative Inquiry,” this book is full of cites to the kinds of “precedents” that can’t be found in Westlaw or Lexis.  Congressional investigative staff, agency lawyers and anyone who practices in this field will want to be sure to have a copy of this work on the shelf.

 

 

Renzi Magistrate Makes Speech or Debate Even More Confusing

           The Magistrate Judge in the Renzi case has issued this report and recommendation on Renzi’s claim that the indictment violated the Speech or Debate Clause. 

            To recap, (now former) Congressman Renzi is alleged to have told landowners who wished to obtain federal land exchange legislation that he would sponsor the bill only if they purchased for inclusion in the exchange certain property owned by a James Sandlin (who happened to owe Renzi a substantial sum of money). 

            The government’s primary argument is that these allegations do not offend the Speech or Debate Clause because they involve only future legislative acts.  It relies on cases, such as United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979), which hold that the promise to vote for a bill in the future, at least in the context of the promise being made in exchange for a bribe, is not a legislative act protected by Speech or Debate. 

            The Magistrate begins his analysis by accepting the basic thrust of the government’s argument.  He states that “the government may establish the allegations with proof involving promises to vote and solicit other votes for the respective land swap proposals in return for the purchase of the Sandlin property; such promises are promises to perform future legislative acts, and as such, under Helstoski, are not protected.” 

            However, as the Magistrate obliquely acknowledges, the matter is not so simple as the foregoing quote would suggest.  The Renzi case would have been on all fours with Helstoski if Renzi were alleged to have promised to vote for the land exchange legislation in return for the purchase of some property unrelated to the legislation.  The same would be true if Renzi had allegedly stated that he would vote for the land exchange legislation only if the Sandlin property were included and the purchaser paid more than X amount for it.  In actuality, however, these allegations have not been made; instead, the core of the prosecution’s case is simply that Renzi corruptly insisted that he would support the land exchange legislation only if the Sandlin property were included.

In the ensuing ten pages, the Magistrate struggles to explain why this difference makes no difference. As he observes, the case law has not “established any definitive boundary for the lower courts to apply to establish whether an activity involves Speech or Debate.” Unfortunately, the Magistrate’s discussion does not bring that boundary into sharper focus; if anything, he blurs the lines even more.

Renzi argued that negotiating with private landholders is a routine and inherent part of the legislative process for land exchange legislation. The Magistrate’s response to this argument is particularly confusing: “Renzi’s conduct alleged in the indictment may be routine, it may be “procedurally” akin to negotiating an amendment to draft legislation, and some day communication between private landowners drafting legislation in the hopes their local representative might support it, and a representative who might at some future time support such legislation may be provided constitutional protections befitting that relationship, but presently this Court does not find that it is protected under the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution.” (emphasis in original).

What does this mean? Is the Magistrate suggesting that Renzi’s position is logical, but somehow conflicts with existing case law? Or is it that Renzi’s position may be right, but the Magistrate does not intend to be the first judge to say so? Hard to tell.

The Magistrate ascribes considerable significance to the fact that Renzi’s negotiations with the landowners occurred before legislation was introduced. He indicates at one point that the same negotiations, had they taken place before legislation was introduced, would have been “probably protected,” and, at another, “clearly protected” by Speech or Debate. Presumably the Magistrate is persuaded that such negotiations would themselves be part of the legislative process and therefore covered by Speech or Debate, even though they involve references to future legislative acts. For reasons that are unexplained, however, the Magistrate does not believe that the same can be said about negotiations that precede the introduction of legislation. To muddy the waters further, the Magistrate asserts that “there is no artificial line drawn at the introduction of legislation.”

Regardless of whether the negotiations were part of the legislative process, however, the Magistrate acknowledges it would be impermissible for the prosecution to use that evidence to impugn Renzi’s motivation for sponsoring the land exchange legislation. He states that “inquiring into Renzi’s motivation for telling the land proponents to include the property in their exchange packages, or Renzi’s motivation for sponsoring the package, would draw an impermissible inference into Renzi’s legislative acts, and would be privileged.”

This is, of course, precisely what the indictment seems to do when it alleges that Renzi and Sandlin entered into a conspiracy to deprive the United States of its right to Renzi’s “honest services” by “using the promise of Renzi’s exercise of his official authority in their favor to compel [the landowners] to purchase the Sandlin Property.” Although the indictment may not expressly state that Renzi had a corrupt motivation for telling landowners, this is implicit in the charges. If Renzi did not have a corrupt motivation for insisting that the Sandlin property be included in the legislative proposal, then the United States was not deprived of his honest services and there would be no basis for the indictment.

Finally, a word must be said about the Magistrate’s most far-fetched attempt to attempt to avoid the application of Speech or Debate. He suggests that the Clause does not apply because the alleged activities exceeded Congress’s jurisdiction. Why? Not because Congress lacks the power to enact land exchange legislation. Instead the Magistrate claims that “Congress’s jurisdiction in this instance certainly does not reach as far as the illegal conduct alleged to take place in the negotiations between the landowners and Renzi solely for the personal enrichment of Renzi.” In other words, because Renzi was alleged to have acted illegally, he is not entitled to protection of Speech or Debate. This assertion would make the Speech or Debate privilege meaningless. As the Helstoski Court noted, “the Speech or Debate Clause was designed to preclude prosecution of Members for legislative acts.” It would hardly achieve this purpose if the government could evade its strictures when the legislative acts were illegal.

In conclusion, I have to give the Magistrate some credit for grappling with the difficult case law in this area. Speech or Debate law is complicated, sometimes inconsistent and definitely under-theorized. Unfortunately, the Magistrate’s foray has not improved matters.

Lobbyist’s Invitation Raises Ethical Issue

            Via Election Law Blog and Political Activity Law comes this story from The Washington Times:  Senator Diane Feinstein cancelled a fundraiser after the lobbyist hosting it sent out an invitation using the Senator’s committee assignments as the theme for the event’s meal: 

Washington lobbyist Heather Podesta mentioned the intelligence committee in an e-mail invitation attached to a formal notice of the event, saying that the lunch at the upscale Charlie Palmer steakhouse in Washington would begin at noon. In the e-mail, she said donors who gave between $1,000 and $2,500 could order up “the Select Committee on Intelligence for the first course.”  

With a check “payable to Feinstein for Senate,” the e-mail said other courses include “your choice of Appropriations, Judiciary or Rules committees,” other panels on which she serves. 

What caught my eye from the article was this comment from Melanie Sloan, executive director of CREW.  Sloan is quoted as calling the invitation “audacious, but legal.”  She goes on to say: “By correlating a fixed-price menu with Sen. Feinstein’s committee assignments, Podesta does what most of Washington assiduously seeks to avoid — makes clear that members of Congress are for sale.”  

Now Podesta’s invitation clearly showed bad judgment and illustrates the kind of behavior that ethical lobbyists should strive to avoid.  To say that the invitation “makes clear” that Senator Feinstein is “for sale,” however, goes a bit far.  A more charitable explanation is that the invitation was intended as a humorous way of conveying the Senator’s committee assignments.  No doubt this was for the benefit of invitees with an interest in matters before those committees, but this is still a long way from suggesting that either the Senator or the committees are for sale.   

It should be noted that lobbyists, at least those who are lawyers (as Podesta is), have ethical obligations that go beyond what is merely “legal.”  If Sloan’s interpretation of the invitation were correct, it would seem that Podesta would have violated Rule 8.4 of the D.C. Bar Rules of Professional Conduct.  This rule provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official.”   

It is a worthwhile caution for all lawyer-lobbyists to remember this rule, and to refrain from comments that can be interpreted as claiming an ability to improperly influence Members of Congress.

Secretary and Clerk Close Lobbying Loophole

The Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the House have just issued a “clarification” that closes the “one free lobbying contact per quarter” loophole that I have discussed here, here and here in the last few days.  Under the clarified guidance, a registered lobbyist cannot be de-listed merely because that “individual did not in the current quarter and does not reasonably expect in the upcoming quarter to make more than one lobbying contact per quarter.” 

In the event that a registered lobbyist no longer reasonably expects to make any future lobbying contacts, the clarified guidance would still permit de-listing.  Although the statute does not directly address this situation, it seems to me a reasonable inference from the statutory definitions is that a “lobbyist” or an employee “acting as a lobbyist” is someone who is expected to make at least an occasional lobbying contact.  Otherwise, someone who technically qualified as a lobbyist at one time (even a junior employee who attended a couple of meetings) could remain so for years merely because he or she provided, or was expected to provide, even incidental support for lobbying contacts made by others.   

            It undoubtedly will be argued that this will enable de-listing of someone who functions as a “de facto lobbyist” behind the scenes, but who avoids lobbying contacts in order to escape the burdens of being designated as a registered lobbyist.  This problem, however, exists in any case for “de facto lobbyists” who never engage in more than one lobbying contact.  Moreover, to make de-listing unreasonably difficult would itself tend to discourage people from registering as lobbyists in the first place.  All in all, it seems to me that the Secretary and Clerk have reasonably resolved this issue.

Secretary and Clerk Acknowledge Review of Lobbying Loophole

From The Hill: 

“These new questions have prompted us to review the guidance to ensure that there are no inadvertent loopholes,” said Beth Provenzano, deputy chief of staff for the Senate secretary’s office. She added that the guidance was thoroughly vetted with Senate and House institutional attorneys before it was issued.

“We are actively reviewing the issue to see if there is a problem,” said the House clerk’s office in a statement.

Why did the President Cross the Road?

            Danielle Brian of the Project on Government Oversight has posted some thoughts regarding the President’s removal of the Inspector General for the Corporation for National and Community Service.  While Brian notes various troubling aspects of this matter (for more details see here), she contends that the removal complies with the letter, if not the spirit, of the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008 (a law co-sponsored by then-Senator Obama). 

            The IG Reform Act provides in pertinent part that “[i]f an Inspector General is removed from office or is transferred to another position or location within an establishment, the President shall communicate in writing the reasons for any such removal or transfer to both Houses of Congress, not later than 30 days before the removal or transfer.”  The President evidently attempted to comply with this requirement by letter to Congress in which he “explained” the removal as follows: “[I]t is vital that I have the fullest confidence in the appointees serving as Inspector General.  That is no longer the case with regard to this Inspector General.” 

            Brian argues that this “minimal explanation” satisfies the legal requirement.  She notes that Congress chose not to adopt a provision that would have limited the President’s ability to remove IGs to specific grounds, namely permanent incapacity, inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance, felony conviction, gross mismanagement or waste funds, or abuse of authority.  Because Congress did not require that the President to have a good reason for firing an IG, she argues, it has only itself to blame for the fact that the President has given a bad one. 

            While Brian may very well be right that Congress would have done better to prohibit removal of IGs except for good cause, I do not see the connection between this issue and the notification provision.  Perhaps the President can, for example, remove an IG because his horoscope says that it is a good day to fire someone, but the law still requires him to notify Congress that this is the reason for the removal.   

            When Congress required the President to state the reasons for removing an IG, it was not looking for an answer analogous to the response to “why did the chicken cross the road?”  Explaining that the President removed or transferred an IG  because he lacks confidence in him is little better than explaining that the chicken crossed the road to get  to the other side.  The question remains, why did the President lose confidence in the IG? 

            The problem here is not that the President has given a bad reason for the removal.  It is that he has failed to give a reason at all or, at best, has given only one of the reasons for the removal.  The statute requires that the President give the “reasons” for the removal.  Unless the President lost confidence in the CNCS IG for no reason at all, the notice to Congress fails to meet this requirement.

Loophole Closing?

Via Election Law Blog, Ken Gross notes that the Clerk and Secretary are reconsidering the guidance that would allow de-listing of a lobbyist who engages in no more than one lobbying contact per quarter.  This comports with my information.  I suspect that there will be additional guidance in the near future that closes this loophole.

More on Lobbyist De-listing

Covington’s Political Law Update (hat tip again to Rick Hasen) also discusses the “de-listing” of lobbyist issue, stating as follows: 

“Many in Washington had interpreted the structure of the statute to mean that the 3-month period applies to the 20% time threshold, but not to the two-or-more-contacts requirement. The Clerk and Secretary apparently read this definition to mean that a lobbyist is an individual employed or retain for services that include more than one lobbying contact per quarter. If the Clerk and the Secretary stick to this view, individuals who have not had more than one contact in two consecutive quarters (and do not plan to in the future) can de-list, even if they still spend more than 20% of their time on lobbying activities. The Obama Administration’s restrictions on registered lobbyists has made the question of when a lobbyist can de-register more important than ever. Because the statutory basis for the Clerk and Secretary’s interpretation is somewhat dubious, it may be prudent to hold off a bit on de-listings until it is clear that they intend to stand by their interpretation.” 

Although the language of the new guidance seems quite clear, I think Covington’s caution is well-advised—it would be prudent to see if the Clerk and Secretary decide to reconsider this issue.

Lobbying Loophole?

            The Clerk of the House and Secretary of the Senate last week released new guidance on the requirements of the Lobbying Disclosure Act.  Among other things, this guidance addressed when a registrant may “terminate” a lobbyist (i.e., remove an individual from the list of persons who act as lobbyists on that registrant’s reports).  This is an issue that has become important only in the last couple of years, as being a “registered lobbyist” now involves both regulatory burdens and restrictions on one’s ability to obtain employment in the Obama Administration.   

            The new guidance states: “A registrant may remove a lobbyist only when (i) that individual’s lobbying activities on behalf of that client did not constitute at the end of the current quarter, and are not reasonably expected in the upcoming quarter to constitute, 20 percent of the time that such employee is engaged in total activities for that client; or (ii) that individual did not in the current quarter and does not reasonably expect in the upcoming quarter to make more than one lobbying contact per quarter.” 

            As pointed out by the law firm of Caplin and Drysdale (hat tip: Rick Hasen’s Election Law Blog), this guidance is problematic because “[t]he LDA, as well as prior House and Senate guidance, make clear that an individual qualifies as a lobbyist by spending 20% of his/her time engaged in lobbying activities for a client in a calendar quarter and making two or more lobbying contacts over the course of services provided for that client (even if the second contact occurs in a later quarter). Thus, an individual qualifies as a lobbyist if he/she made two or more lobbying contacts at any point during their work for a client, and not merely in the current or subsequent calendar quarter.”   

            Under the new guidance, someone who has made more than one lobbying contact for a client in the past, and continues to spend more than 20 percent of his or her time on lobbying activities, could apparently be de-listed if he or she made no more than one lobbying contact in the current quarter and did not expect to make more than one in the upcoming quarter.  This would essentially mean that one could be an unregistered lobbyist so long as one is careful to limit one’s lobbying contacts to one per quarter, though this would seem contrary to the language and prior interpretation of the LDA. 

            This would seem to open up a very significant new loophole in the LDA.