Don’t be a Potted Plant and Other Takeaways from CREW v. Trump

Judge Daniels of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York has issued this opinion (hat tip: Eric Columbus) dismissing the Emoluments Clause lawsuit spearheaded by Citizens for Ethics and Responsibility in Washington (CREW). The court found that neither CREW nor its co-plaintiffs (individuals and businesses in competition with hotels and restaurants owned by the Trump Organization) had standing to sue President Trump for allegedly violating the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses.

Much of the court’s analysis is focused on explaining why the plaintiffs have not suffered legally redressable injuries from the alleged constitutional violations. Professor Jonathan Adler has a good summary of the court’s reasoning here, and I have nothing in particular to add with respect to that aspect of the opinion. I do, however, have a few additional observations.

First, while the court makes clear (see op. at 2, n.1) it is not addressing the merits of the case, I think one can sense some skepticism from the court about the plaintiffs’ theory of liability. The gravamen of their claims is that Trump’s “’vast, complicated and secret’ business interests are creating conflicts of interest and have resulted in unprecedented government influence in violation of the Domestic and Foreign Emoluments Clauses of the United States Constitution.” Op. at 1.

As the court notes, however, nothing in the Constitution prevents Trump from operating an extensive business empire that competes with CREW’s co-plaintiffs as to non-government business. Op. at 17. To the extent the Constitution might be construed to apply to business transactions with governmental entities, the effect on the Trump Organization would be largely incidental. As the court points out, even in that circumstance the Constitution would not prohibit the Trump Organization from doing business with foreign (or state) governments; it would simply prevent Trump from personally accepting income or profits from these transactions. Op. at 14 & n.3. Trump thus can fix any constitutional problem if he has not already, and Congress can waive any constitutional problem under the Foreign Emoluments Clause (FEC) anyway. Op. at 15. In short, Judge Daniels effectively rejects the notions that the Constitution prohibits the Trump Organization from operating during the Trump presidency or that Trump needs to divest himself of all interest in his businesses.

A second and more important takeaway from the opinion relates specifically to the FEC. Judge Daniels did not merely hold that these particular plaintiffs lack standing to sue. Instead, he found that any claim under the FEC would be non-justiciable. Op. at 25-26. As the court explains:

Here, the issue presented under the Foreign Emoluments Clause is whether Defendant can continue to receive income from his business with foreign governments without the consent of Congress. As the explicit language of the [FEC] makes clear, this is an issue committed exclusively to Congress. As the only political branch with the power to consent to violations of the [FEC], Congress is the appropriate body to determine whether, and to what extent, Defendant’s conduct unlawfully infringes on that power. If Congress determines that an infringement has occurred, it is up to Congress to decide whether to challenge or acquiesce to Defendant’s conduct. As such, this case presents a non-justiciable political question.

Op. at 26 (emphasis added).

In addition, the court found that plaintiffs’ claims were premature because Congress itself had taken no action with regard to Trump’s alleged violations of the FEC. (One might add that Congress had little opportunity to do so, given that CREW filed its lawsuit on the first day of the administration.) The result might be different, the court implied, if in the future Congress were to find Trump’s activities required congressional consent. Op. at 27-28. But it is not the court’s role to tell Congress what to do or “how it should or should not assert its power in responding to Defendant’s alleged violations of the Foreign Emoluments Clause.” Id.

In a footnote, Judge Daniels underscored this point: “Congress is not a potted plant. It is a co-equal branch of the federal government with the power to act as a body in response to Defendant’s alleged Foreign Emoluments Clause violations, if it chooses to do so.” Op. at 28 n.8.

Needless to say (or, rather, as I have already said here and here), I am in strong agreement with the court’s approach to justiciability of the FEC claim. The House and/or Senate should give serious consideration to filing an amicus brief defending the court’s decision if and when CREW appeals to the Second Circuit.

Congress can also justify Judge Daniels’ confidence by demonstrating that it is not in fact a potted plant. It should initiate a review of Trump’s business interests to ensure there are adequate safeguards to prevent violations of the FEC or any other unacceptable conflicts of interest. Upon reflection, I think the best way to conduct a serious, nonpublic and nonpartisan review of this matter would be to entrust it to the GAO, possibly under the auspices of the Joint Committee on Taxation.

Finally, I must note that Judge Daniels makes no mention of the theory, advanced by Professor Tillman as amicus curiae, that the FEC is inapplicable to the president, other than to note that “[f]or purposes of this motion, Defendant has conceded that he is subject to the Foreign Emoluments Clause.” Op. at 6 n.2. Make of this what you will, but perhaps it suggests the court was not bowled over by Tillman’s theory? As an exercise in reading tea leaves this seems as least as plausible as Tillman’s apparently inferring from these orders in District of Columbia v. Trump (another emoluments case) that Judge Messitte is interested in hearing more about his theory. But we will see.

“Nothing I have done as a senator, nothing, has brought dishonor on this institution . . .”

“And I am confident the ethics committee would agree.”

I was struck by these words from Senator Al Franken’s resignation speech (or perhaps semi-resignation speech) today. While Franken is to some extent denying the factual allegations (i.e., groping various women) made against him, the point of this particular line was to stress that he has done nothing “as a senator” to dishonor the Senate. One has to assume that he is saying that even if the allegations against him are true, they would not constitute “improper conduct which may reflect upon the Senate,” as these words are used in S. Res. 338 (2)(a)(1). (Otherwise there would be no reason for the qualification “as a senator” in his statement.).

The Senate Ethics Manual makes clear a senator may be disciplined “for any misconduct, including conduct or activity which does not directly relate to official duties, when such conduct unfavorably reflects on the institution as a whole.” Senate Ethics Manual at 13; see also id. at 432-36 (reviewing conduct found by the Senate to constitute “improper conduct which may reflect upon the Senate” or bring the Senate into “dishonor and disrepute”). But in all of the cases in which the Senate has taken disciplinary action, there has been at least some indirect connection between the misconduct and the senator’s official duties or status.

The most tenuous such connection was in the case of Senator Larry Craig, who was charged with a misdemeanor for soliciting sex in a men’s bathroom at the Minneapolis airport. The Senate ethics committee ultimately issued a letter of admonition to Craig over the incident, in which the committee found that Craig had improperly attempted to use his position to avoid being arrested and charged, and then had improperly attempted to avoid the consequences of his guilty plea.  The committee’s letter to Craig concluded that “[t]he conduct to which you pled guilty, together with your related and subsequent conduct as set forth above, constitutes improper conduct reflecting discreditably on the Senate.” (Yes, the committee used the word “pled,” which apparently means its letter was written by Donald Trump).

Simon Davidson, Roll Call’s ethics columnist, and I debated at the time whether the Craig case involved the first instance of the ethics committee punishing a senator in part for purely personal conduct (i.e., soliciting sex in a bathroom) or whether the committee’s action was dependent on Craig’s subsequent actions which involved conduct at least somewhat related to Craig’s official duties. My view was that the committee was in fact exercising jurisdiction over purely personal conduct, though attempting to downplay that aspect of its action. As I noted, “the committee understandably does not want to be in the business (or advertise that it is in the business) of investigating or punishing sexual misconduct or other common indiscretions by Senators.”

My broader interpretation of the Craig admonishment would support the committee’s exercise of jurisdiction in the Franken case, except for one very important distinction. Craig was a senator at the time he engaged in the misconduct. Franken was not. As mentioned in my last post, the Senate has never disciplined any senator for conduct that occurred before he or she entered the Senate. Moreover, it has on a number of occasions refused to do so precisely because of doubts about its jurisdiction over such matters.

The combination of the personal nature of Franken’s alleged misconduct and the fact that it occurred before he entered the Senate makes it highly questionable whether this is a matter that the ethics committee could even investigate based on past precedent. There is certainly no precedent that would support the imposition of any serious sanction based on the facts alleged, even if they are all true.

Which is perhaps why Franken wanted the matter before the ethics committee in the first place.

The Senate’s Authority to Punish or Expel Roy Moore: A Response to Stan Brand

Former House Counsel Stan Brand has written this article in Politico entitled “Why the Law Might Not Allow the Senate to Expel Roy Moore.” I am working on a longer piece dealing with jurisdictional and prudential limits on the Senate Ethics Committee, but I want to take this opportunity to comment on Brand’s article. In brief, I agree with Brand on the bottom line (i.e., it will be extraordinarily difficult for the Senate to punish, much less expel, Moore for his alleged misconduct), but I think a little more precision with regard to the constitutional and legal issues would be helpful.

Moore, of course, is the Republican candidate in the Alabama special senate election to be held on December 12. For the last month or so (it seems longer), the main issue in that election has been Moore’s alleged sexual misconduct with a number of teenage girls (at least one as young as 14) about 30 years ago. If Moore should win the election, senate leaders have suggested that he will nonetheless have to face these accusations before the Senate itself.

As Brand notes, it is clear that the law does not permit the Senate to “exclude” Moore, that is, to refuse to seat him on the grounds that he lacks the constitutional qualifications to serve in the Senate. Moore has the constitutionally prescribed qualifications (age, citizenship and residency) and so the Senate must seat him.

But the Senate also has the power to punish any senator for “disorderly behavior” and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, a senator may be expelled. Brand suggests that these powers may not extend to Moore’s case for three reasons: (1) Moore’s misconduct occurred in a prior Congress; (2) Moore’s conduct occurred before he entered the Senate; and (3) Moore’s conduct was known to the electorate at the time that it (hypothetically) elected him.

The first of these points is not well taken. It is true that there is language in early precedents suggesting that members cannot be punished or expelled for conduct occurring in prior congresses. (Professor Turley alluded to this idea as well). To the extent that this position was ever seriously entertained, it made more sense for the House (all the members of which stand for election every two years) than for the Senate, a continuing body consisting of members elected for six year terms. But in any event, both bodies have long recognized that they can punish or expel members for conduct occurring in prior congresses. House rules, for example, allow its ethics committee to investigate matters going back to the third previous congress and longer if the committee determines the prior conduct is directly related to an alleged violation occurring in more recent congress. House Rule XI (3) (b) (3). The Senate has declined to adopt any statute of limitations at all.

The second point is far more substantial. As far as I know, neither the House nor the Senate has ever disciplined, much less expelled, a member for conduct preceding his or her first election to the legislative body. On a number of occasions, the Senate has declined the opportunity to take cognizance of alleged misconduct occurring before first election. The only question is whether this precedent reflects a jurisdictional limit (i.e., a constitutional limit on the Senate’s power) or merely a strong aversion to using the Senate’s power in such situations. It should also be noted that whether the limit is jurisdictional or prudential, there is some precedent that a senator can waive the limit by asking for an investigation of his own conduct. See Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution 252 (2017) (discussing the 1904 case of Senator Charles Dietrich, who asked the Senate to appoint a committee to investigate allegations that he behaved corruptly in his prior position as governor of Nebraska). This is a point that Moore’s lawyers will want to keep in mind (as perhaps Senator Al Franken’s should have as well).

Finally, Brand’s third point alludes to the “Wilkes principle,” which we have discussed in this blog on prior occasions (see here, here, and here). Essentially, it means that a legislative body should not expel a member for conduct that was fully known to the voters at the time of his or her most recent election. The voters, as Benjamin Cassady puts it, have the power to grant an “electoral pardon” with respect to a candidate’s prior misconduct. See Benjamin Cassady, “You’ve Got Your Crook, I’ve Got Mine,” 32 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 209, 218 (2014).

Like Professor Chafetz, I doubt that this limit is jurisdictional in nature. See Josh Chafetz, Democracy’s Privileged Few 210-12 (2007). Although ordinarily it would be “impermissibly undemocratic” for a legislative body to expel a member after his or her constituents have indicated either forgiveness or approval of the conduct in question, the framers of the Constitution declined to prohibit expulsion twice for the same offense. In truly extraordinary circumstances, therefore, it may be permissible for the legislative body to expel a member for conduct known to the voters. In addition, there is always the possibility that “new” information not available to the voters will emerge after the election. At the moment, however, it seems very unlikely that the Senate could expel Moore without violating the Wilkes principle.

In short, while reasonable people can disagree whether the Senate has the constitutional authority to expel (or even punish) Moore for the conduct in question, there can be no doubt that the Senate would have to go well beyond any of its existing precedents to take such action.