Point of Order

           The Government has filed its opposition to former Congressman Renzi’s appeal of the Magistrate Judge’s Speech or Debate rulings.  Its brief argues that “[t]he crux of the honest services case against Renzi . . . are his acts of receiving a personal benefit for a decision while purporting to be exercising independent discretion, as well as his nondisclosure of material information to Resolution Copper and the Aries Group.”  (brief at p. 10, emphasis added).  This, it argues, is not covered by Speech or Debate because it is indistinguishable from bribery cases (like United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932 (2d Cir. 1980) and United States v. Williams, 644 F.2d 950 (2d Cir. 1981)) in which the Member of Congress is prosecuted for accepting personal benefits given for the purpose of influencing the Member in regard to future legislative action. 

            But there is a distinction between cases like Myers and Williams, on the one hand, and Renzi’s, on the other.  In bribery cases the personal benefit can be separated from the legislative action, at least in theory.  The Member is charged with having accepted money (or some other personal benefit) from the bribegiver.  The only thing that need be proved with respect to the Member’s state of mind is his knowledge of the bribegiver’s corrupt intent, namely that the money is intended to influence the Member’s future legislative actions.  The Member’s own intent or state of mind with regard to the legislation is irrelevant. 

            The Renzi case, however, is different.  As the government itself notes, Renzi is charged with making a decision (i.e., which bill to support) on the basis of something other than his “independent discretion.”  In other words, he is charged with supporting legislation not because he believed it was in the public interest to do so, but because he stood to gain financially from it.  Thus, his state of mind with regard to the legislation itself is in issue.  The government simply ignores this fundamental point. 

            The government also discusses the D.C. Circuit’s recent decision in the Feeney case (which I discussed in previous posts).  In that case, former Congressman Feeney had claimed that his golfing trip to Scotland was for “legislative factfinding” purposes.  The D.C. Circuit made a point of noting that such legislative factfinding is protected by Speech or Debate.  The Renzi prosecutors, however, discount this language, noting that the issue in Feeney was whether his testimony before the Ethics Committee was protected by Speech or Debate, not whether his activities in Scotland were protected. 

            The D.C. Circuit’s statements regarding the allegedly legislative nature of Feeney’s trip may have been dicta, but they certainly suggest that the court viewed not only Feeney’s testimony, but also his trip, to be entitled to Speech or Debate protection.  In any event, the Feeney and Renzi cases together illustrate an important fact about judicial interpretation of the Speech or Debate Clause.  Too often it seems that what passes for Speech or Debate “analysis” is really nothing more than judges issuing the magic words that certain acts are “legislative” and certain acts are “non-legislative,” with little connection to the purpose that the Clause is intended to serve.   

         Whatever “legislative factfinding” Feeney was doing while golfing at St. Andrews, the connection between his trip and the legislative process seems vastly more attenuated than with that with respect to Renzi’s discussions about land exchange legislation.  Without a coherent theory of why Speech or Debate protection exists in the first place, both legislators and the general public will understandably look at cases like these and wonder- what is the Speech or Debate Clause good for?

             As suggested in my last post, Judge Kavanaugh’s concurrence in In re Grand Jury (Feeney) rejects the Ray/Rose test as incoherent and unworkable.  He argues that it makes no sense to condition the Speech or Debate protection given to a Member’s communication with the Ethics Committee on the subject matter of the underlying proceeding.  He observes that the Constitution gives each House “expansive authority” to discipline its own Members for improper behavior, whether that behavior is arguably “official” (Ray) or “personal” (Rose).  At least to the extent that a disciplinary proceeding falls within that broad grant of jurisdiction, a Member’s communication with the Ethics Committee should be treated the same regardless of the subject matter of the proceeding.  

            Kavanaugh would replace the Ray/Rose test with a simple proposition: “courts must protect, without qualification, a Member’s speech in an official congressional disciplinary proceeding.”  He argues that this conclusion is required by both the text of the Constitution and by Supreme Court caselaw.  With regard to the former, he contends that a Member’s communication with the Ethics Committee in the context of a disciplinary proceeding is self-evidently “Speech . . . in either House” protected by the Speech or Debate Clause.  It also falls comfortably within the Supreme Court’s description, in Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972), of the Clause as encompassing matters that are “an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House.”   

            In my judgment, Kavanaugh is clearly correct in rejecting the Ray/Rose distinction.  It is less obvious, however, that he is correct in treating all Member communications with the Ethics Committee as “speech” protected by the Clause.  One could argue that a Member’s written or oral testimony to the Ethics Committee, while literally “speech,” is not given in the Member’s capacity as a Member (and thus not “an integral part” of the processes by which Members “participate in committee . . . proceedings”), but as a witness to facts relevant to the proceeding.  Thus, the Member’s speech in this capacity should be treated no differently than that of a congressional staffer or private citizen called upon to give evidence.

Consider, for example, an election contest held before the Committee on House Administration. Like disciplinary proceedings, election contests are a judicial function exercised by each House of Congress pursuant to explicit constitutional authority. Following Kavanaugh’s reasoning, the testimony of an incumbent Member in an election contest would be protected by Speech or Debate, while the testimony of the adverse party (i.e., the as yet unsuccessful challenger seeking the Member’s seat) presumably would not be. It would seem more logical, however, to treat the two in the same fashion, reflecting the fact that both are in the same relationship, that of party/witnesses, to the tribunal.

This suggests that the question is more complex than Kavanaugh makes it out to be. It is also worth noting that Kavanaugh’s proposed solution would have a significant impact on the relationship between congressional proceedings and the criminal law. As he acknowledges, it would make it impossible to prosecute Members for false statements made in congressional proceedings. Arguably, this would apply not only to evidence submitted in a disciplinary proceeding, but to Member filings of financial disclosure or travel reports, which are also (literally) “Speech . . . in either House.”

Part of the problem here is the loose connection between the ostensible purpose of Speech or Debate and the way that it has actually been applied by the courts. Kavanaugh notes that the Clause was designed to “assure[] Members of Congress ‘wide freedom of speech, debate and deliberation without intimidation or threats from the Executive Branch.’” (quoting Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616). He does not explain, however, how either the panel’s decision or his proposed solution would achieve that laudable goal.

Consider the fact pattern before the court. Former Congressman Feeney’s troubles originated with a 2003 golfing trip to Scotland that was apparently paid for by lobbyist Jack Abramoff, although Feeney’s travel report failed to disclose this fact.

Under existing doctrine, there is nothing preventing the Justice Department from investigating or prosecuting alleged crimes associated with the trip, such as bribery (if the trip were alleged to be in exchange for an official act), illegal gratuity (if the trip were alleged to be on account of an official act) or filing of a false travel report. To prove such criminal conduct, the Department could introduce evidence of non-legislative official acts performed by Feeney on Abramoff’s behalf (such as intervening with an executive agency) or discussions between Feeney and Abramoff about potential future legislative acts.

It is easy to imagine, therefore, that the Justice Department might use its power to do the very things the Speech or Debate Clause was supposedly designed to prevent. It could seek to intimidate Feeney so that he would become more amenable to the executive branch’s position on certain issues. It could seek to retaliate against Feeney because it disliked his legislative positions or actions or because it disapproved of his relationship with Abramoff. It could seek to weaken him politically so that he could be defeated in the next election.

Given these existing options for prosecutors, it is hard to see how the panel’s decision makes Feeney less vulnerable to executive branch intimidation or threats. It makes it marginally more difficult for prosecutors to gather evidence, but nothing in the decision (or in Kavanaugh’s rationale for the decision) prevents the government from directly investigating or prosecuting Feeney for conduct related to the Scottish trip.

One might argue that prohibiting the government from subpoenaing a Member’s statements to the Ethics Committee would protect the independence and autonomy of the Committee itself, as opposed to the individual Member. The Committee might fear that prosecutors will, in effect, second guess its decisions, drawing different conclusions from the same evidence. The Committee might also find it more difficult to obtain evidence if witnesses were worried that their testimony could be subpoenaed by federal prosecutors. (I suspect that House Counsel, which filed an amicus brief in the Feeney case, made an argument along these lines).

The problem with this argument, however, is that the panel decision is both underprotective and overprotective from the standpoint of these concerns. It is underprotective because it applies only to a subpoena for the testimony of a Member; it does not prevent prosecutors from issuing subpoenas to the Ethics Committee witnesses or otherwise seeking to probe the workings of the Ethics Committee.

More important, the decision overprotects the Ethics Committee’s interests in autonomy. It does not merely prevent prosecutors from obtaining or using information without the consent of the Committee. (This is unlike, for example, the Third Circuit case where prosecutors sought to subpoena information regarding former Congressman McDade directly from the Ethics Committee and the court upheld the Committee’s assertion of Speech or Debate). Under the panel’s ruling, prosecutors would be unable to use a Member’s testimony even if the Ethics Committee voluntarily turned it over to prosecutors, something that is explicitly contemplated by House Rules.

This means that the only interest truly protected by the panel’s ruling is Feeney’s interest in a “wide freedom of speech” with respect to his communications with the Ethics Committee. This seems like a peculiar interest to protect. When a Member is providing factual information to a congressional committee performing a judicial function, we expect him, like other witnesses, to provide the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, something which is antithetical to the notion of exercising a “wide freedom of speech.”

Having said all this, I remain troubled by the subpoenas to Feeney’s lawyers. But the reason that I am troubled is that the subpoenas were seeking information which is confidential under House Rules and which those rules provide is to be released to federal prosecutors only upon an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Ethics Committee. See House Rule XI, 3(a)(3). This is a problem that should be addressed through a separation-of-powers analysis. It is not an issue that easily fits within the language or purpose of the Speech or Debate Clause.

             The D.C. Circuit issued a significant Speech or Debate ruling last month in a case involving former Congressman Tom Feeney.  Feeney had been investigated by the House Ethics Committee for accepting a privately financed trip which allegedly violated House Rules because it was paid for by a lobbyist and/or was “substantially recreational in nature.”   

            After the ethics investigation was closed, federal prosecutors began looking into the matter.  Grand jury subpoenas were issued to Feeney’s lawyers seeking information about the statements that Feeney had made to the Ethics Committee (although it is not clear from the opinion, it appears that the investigation may have focused on whether these statements were truthful).  Feeney and his lawyers moved to quash the subpoenas based on the Speech or Debate Clause.  The district court denied the motion, holding that “the congressman was not acting in his legislative capacity but in his personal capacity as a witness to facts relevant to the Committee’s investigation.” 

            At first glance, the district court’s conclusion would appear to be well-supported by the D.C. Circuit’s decision in United States v. Rose, 28 F.3d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1994).  Rose involved a congressman who was sued by the Justice Department for filing false financial disclosure statements that failed to disclose personal loans he had received from his campaign and other sources.  The suit relied upon the congressman’s testimony before the House Ethics Committee, which had previously investigated the same issue.  The court rejected the argument that this use of the testimony violated the Speech or Debate Clause, noting that the congressman’s testimony did not relate to pending legislation but to his handling of personal financial transactions.  It concluded that he “was acting as a witness to facts relevant to a congressional investigation of his private conduct; he was not acting in a legislative capacity.” 

            In reaching this conclusion, however, the Rose court had to distinguish a prior D.C. Circuit decision, Ray v. Proxmire, 581 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1978), which held that a Senator’s letter to the Senate Ethics Committee was protected by Speech or Debate.  In that case, the Senator was responding to allegations that he had misused Senate rooms by reserving them for the use of his wife’s clients.  The Ray court stated that “[i]n responding to a Senate inquiry into an exercise of his official powers, Senator Proxmire was engaged in a matter central to the jurisdiction of the Senate.”  The Rose court seized upon this reference to the Senator’s “official powers,” finding that Rose’s testimony, in contrast, related to personal financial transactions rather than the use of “official powers.” 

            This distinction, however, makes little sense.  In the first place, it is clear that the ethics committee has jurisdiction over alleged improper filings of financial disclosures, and it is difficult to see why such matters are any less “central to the jurisdiction” of the House or Senate than other allegations of improper conduct by Members.  Second, it is not at all obvious how one concludes that misuse of Senate rooms is more “official” than improper filing of financial disclosures.  In the former case, the Member allegedly misused an official power for personal gain, while in the latter the Member allegedly failed to perform an official duty for personal benefit.  Why this makes a difference for purposes of Speech or Debate protection is not explained by the Rose case. 

            The application of this distinction to the facts of the Feeney case is not self-evident either.  The government argued that the ethics investigation concerned a “personal” matter, i.e., Feeney’s receipt of a privately funded vacation in violation of House Rules.  During the course of the ethics investigation, however, Feeney had argued that his trip was for purposes of legislative fact-finding.  The D.C. Circuit found that this contention (whether or not it was true) transformed the investigation into one of whether Feeney had “abused” his official powers in accepting the trip.  It therefore concluded that the case fell on the Ray side of the Ray/Rose line and that Feeney’s statements to the Ethics Committee were protected by Speech or Debate.      

            Given the incoherence of the Ray/Rose distinction, it is difficult to say with assurance whether the Feeney panel applied it correctly.  As Judge Kavanaugh points out in his concurrence, the Ray/Rose test involves “fine slicing of Member’s speech” that engenders confusion and uncertainty.  It is worth noting, however, that the Feeney decision may add even more uncertainty and confusion to this area.  For example, the panel emphasized the fact that “legislative fact-finding” is itself protected by Speech or Debate.  Does this mean that the case would have been decided differently if the alleged official purpose of the trip had been non-legislative (e.g., giving a speech)?  It is also impossible to tell from the decision what the relationship was between the statements that the government sought to subpoena and the alleged legislative purpose of the trip.  Does the mere fact that the ethics investigation involved an issue of legislative fact-finding mean that all of Feeney’s statements are protected by Speech or Debate, even if they related to other subjects (such as whether the trip was funded by a lobbyist)? 

            Judge Kavanaugh proposes eliminating the Ray/Rose distinction and replacing it with a simple rule that all Member statements in congressional disciplinary proceedings are protected by Speech or Debates.  I will discuss this proposal in a future post.  For now I will simply note that there is much force to Kavanaugh’s argument, but it would have very significant implications that need to be carefully considered. 

            Before leaving the main Feeney decision, it should be noted that it could have implications outside the narrow area of subpoenas for statements made to the Ethics Committee.  If the grand jury were investigating whether the privately financed trip constituted a bribe or illegal gratuity, it might be argued, based on the language of this case, that the Speech or Debate Clause prohibits any inquiry into the trip because of the alleged legislative fact-finding purpose.  Whether the holding in fact extends so far will have to await future litigation.

           The Magistrate Judge in the Renzi case has issued this report and recommendation on Renzi’s claim that the indictment violated the Speech or Debate Clause. 

            To recap, (now former) Congressman Renzi is alleged to have told landowners who wished to obtain federal land exchange legislation that he would sponsor the bill only if they purchased for inclusion in the exchange certain property owned by a James Sandlin (who happened to owe Renzi a substantial sum of money). 

            The government’s primary argument is that these allegations do not offend the Speech or Debate Clause because they involve only future legislative acts.  It relies on cases, such as United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979), which hold that the promise to vote for a bill in the future, at least in the context of the promise being made in exchange for a bribe, is not a legislative act protected by Speech or Debate. 

            The Magistrate begins his analysis by accepting the basic thrust of the government’s argument.  He states that “the government may establish the allegations with proof involving promises to vote and solicit other votes for the respective land swap proposals in return for the purchase of the Sandlin property; such promises are promises to perform future legislative acts, and as such, under Helstoski, are not protected.” 

            However, as the Magistrate obliquely acknowledges, the matter is not so simple as the foregoing quote would suggest.  The Renzi case would have been on all fours with Helstoski if Renzi were alleged to have promised to vote for the land exchange legislation in return for the purchase of some property unrelated to the legislation.  The same would be true if Renzi had allegedly stated that he would vote for the land exchange legislation only if the Sandlin property were included and the purchaser paid more than X amount for it.  In actuality, however, these allegations have not been made; instead, the core of the prosecution’s case is simply that Renzi corruptly insisted that he would support the land exchange legislation only if the Sandlin property were included.

In the ensuing ten pages, the Magistrate struggles to explain why this difference makes no difference. As he observes, the case law has not “established any definitive boundary for the lower courts to apply to establish whether an activity involves Speech or Debate.” Unfortunately, the Magistrate’s discussion does not bring that boundary into sharper focus; if anything, he blurs the lines even more.

Renzi argued that negotiating with private landholders is a routine and inherent part of the legislative process for land exchange legislation. The Magistrate’s response to this argument is particularly confusing: “Renzi’s conduct alleged in the indictment may be routine, it may be “procedurally” akin to negotiating an amendment to draft legislation, and some day communication between private landowners drafting legislation in the hopes their local representative might support it, and a representative who might at some future time support such legislation may be provided constitutional protections befitting that relationship, but presently this Court does not find that it is protected under the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution.” (emphasis in original).

What does this mean? Is the Magistrate suggesting that Renzi’s position is logical, but somehow conflicts with existing case law? Or is it that Renzi’s position may be right, but the Magistrate does not intend to be the first judge to say so? Hard to tell.

The Magistrate ascribes considerable significance to the fact that Renzi’s negotiations with the landowners occurred before legislation was introduced. He indicates at one point that the same negotiations, had they taken place before legislation was introduced, would have been “probably protected,” and, at another, “clearly protected” by Speech or Debate. Presumably the Magistrate is persuaded that such negotiations would themselves be part of the legislative process and therefore covered by Speech or Debate, even though they involve references to future legislative acts. For reasons that are unexplained, however, the Magistrate does not believe that the same can be said about negotiations that precede the introduction of legislation. To muddy the waters further, the Magistrate asserts that “there is no artificial line drawn at the introduction of legislation.”

Regardless of whether the negotiations were part of the legislative process, however, the Magistrate acknowledges it would be impermissible for the prosecution to use that evidence to impugn Renzi’s motivation for sponsoring the land exchange legislation. He states that “inquiring into Renzi’s motivation for telling the land proponents to include the property in their exchange packages, or Renzi’s motivation for sponsoring the package, would draw an impermissible inference into Renzi’s legislative acts, and would be privileged.”

This is, of course, precisely what the indictment seems to do when it alleges that Renzi and Sandlin entered into a conspiracy to deprive the United States of its right to Renzi’s “honest services” by “using the promise of Renzi’s exercise of his official authority in their favor to compel [the landowners] to purchase the Sandlin Property.” Although the indictment may not expressly state that Renzi had a corrupt motivation for telling landowners, this is implicit in the charges. If Renzi did not have a corrupt motivation for insisting that the Sandlin property be included in the legislative proposal, then the United States was not deprived of his honest services and there would be no basis for the indictment.

Finally, a word must be said about the Magistrate’s most far-fetched attempt to attempt to avoid the application of Speech or Debate. He suggests that the Clause does not apply because the alleged activities exceeded Congress’s jurisdiction. Why? Not because Congress lacks the power to enact land exchange legislation. Instead the Magistrate claims that “Congress’s jurisdiction in this instance certainly does not reach as far as the illegal conduct alleged to take place in the negotiations between the landowners and Renzi solely for the personal enrichment of Renzi.” In other words, because Renzi was alleged to have acted illegally, he is not entitled to protection of Speech or Debate. This assertion would make the Speech or Debate privilege meaningless. As the Helstoski Court noted, “the Speech or Debate Clause was designed to preclude prosecution of Members for legislative acts.” It would hardly achieve this purpose if the government could evade its strictures when the legislative acts were illegal.

In conclusion, I have to give the Magistrate some credit for grappling with the difficult case law in this area. Speech or Debate law is complicated, sometimes inconsistent and definitely under-theorized. Unfortunately, the Magistrate’s foray has not improved matters.