Category: Congressional Investigations

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Must Congress Allow Agency Counsel to Attend Depositions?

Last week I wrote a piece for Just Security regarding the State Department’s refusal to produce certain officials for depositions requested by several House  committees (relating, of course, to the Ukraine affair). Among other things, I addressed the question of whether Congress is required to allow government counsel to attend depositions of the current or former officials of their department or agency. OLC (surprise!) says the answer is yes. In my view, the correct answer is no.

Anyway, I thought it would be helpful to collect the materials in one place. Here is the link to the piece. And here are the relevant House rules and regulations.

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What to Look For in the Mazars Oral Argument

Tomorrow the Mazars subpoena case will be argued before the D.C. Circuit (Judges Tatel, Millett and Rao). In this appeal, President Trump (in his private capacity) has advanced a novel and audacious theory in support of his contention that the congressional subpoena at issue lacks a “legitimate legislative purpose.” Trump is asking the D.C. Circuit to reverse the decision of the district court, which denied Trump’s application for an injunction to prevent Mazars, his accounting firm, from producing financial records responsive to the subpoena.

As Judge Mehta pointed out in his decision below, the legal standards employed by the courts to review congressional subpoenas and investigations are generally so deferential that they “do not substantially constrain Congress.” Rather than fighting this proposition head on, Trump’s lawyers focus primarily on seeking a carve-out from Congress’s broad investigatory and oversight authority for those who hold constitutional offices (i.e., the president and Supreme Court justices).

The lynchpin of this argument is the distinction between Congress’s legislative and judicial powers. Although it has long been understood that Congress must have some ability to obtain information needed to consider and craft legislative measures, the scope of this power was once highly controversial. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880), which stressed that Congress, unlike the British Parliament, was not a court of general jurisdiction, it was widely believed that Congress’s authority to compel the production of information for legislative purposes was limited at best. This reading of Kilbourn, however, was undermined by later Supreme Court cases beginning with McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927). These subsequent cases, Judge Mehta noted, render Kilbourn “largely impotent as a guiding constitutional principle.”

Trump attempts to revive Kilbourn for a limited purpose. His theory goes something like this. Congress generally has broad legislative and oversight authority with respect to the departments and agencies of government, including offices created by statute. With respect to constitutional offices, however, Congress’s legislative authority is “severely constrained.” Trump Br. at 4, 38. Thus, Trump claims that Congress cannot rely on its legislative authority to seek his financial records because these records are not relevant to a subject on which legislation may be had.

To be sure, Trump acknowledges that Congress also has powers of a judicial nature. But, following Kilbourn, he stresses that these are not of general scope, but are limited to those areas expressly identified in the Constitution, namely judging elections, disciplining members, and, most importantly, impeachment. For those who hold constitutional offices, therefore, impeachment is the only method (Trump argues) by which Congress can investigate alleged wrongdoing.

Thus, “[w]hile Congress could presumably use subpoenas to advance these non-legislative powers, the Committee has not invoked them.” Trump Br. at 45. In fact, Trump takes pains to demonstrate that Speaker Pelosi has disavowed any intent to go down the path of impeachment. Trump Br. at 47-48.

The novelty of this argument is illustrated by the fact that one of the principal “authorities” cited in Trump’s brief is a three-page law student note that is more than a century old. See Note, Congressional Power to Punish for Contempt, 30 Harv. L. Rev. 384 (1917) (cited in Trump Br. at 17-18). The apparent utility of this note from Trump’s perspective is that it vividly distinguishes congressional contempt in the context of impeachment from that in the context of legislative oversight:

A committee of the House considering an impeachment is like a Grand Jury hearing evidence which may lead to the return of an indictment– it is a judicial body and it is one provided for by the Constitution. It must surely have the power to call witnesses, and the power is of little avail if these witnesses may contemptuously refuse to respond, or may be influenced or intimidated by outside contempts of the body before whom they are testifying. If the House is to sit in a judicial capacity, it must have the protection that a court has.

Note, 30 Harv. L. Rev. at 385. Yet even this note, which predates McGrain, concludes that “[t]he power to legislate . . . by necessary implication include[s] the power to examine witnesses and to compel them to respond by contempt proceedings.” Id. at 386.

Why would the Trump team rely on what seems like a very long shot argument? The short answer is I don’t know, but three possibilities come to mind. First, Trump’s lawyers may simply believe this is the best argument available to them. Second, it may be thought that stressing the lack of impeachment proceedings helps Trump’s cause beyond the confines of this particular case (e.g., with public opinion and/or with courts that will be ruling on more difficult subpoena enforcement issues in the months ahead). Third, Trump’s legal team may believe that advancing a bold legal theory is the best way to get the Supreme Court to grant certiorari, which strings out the proceedings even if it is unlikely to deliver an ultimate victory.

The two things to look for in tomorrow’s argument: (1) how much interest does the panel show in impeachment and why the House has declined to initiate impeachment proceedings to date, and (2) whether Judge Rao (the lone Republican appointee) seems at all open to Trump’s arguments. A unanimous panel opinion will make further review less likely.

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Does the President Enjoy Absolute Testimonial Immunity?

As we saw in my last post, for presidential advisers to have testimonial immunity it is necessary but not sufficient that the president himself have such immunity. Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist noted in 1971 that “[e]veryone associated with the Executive Branch from [the Aaron Burr treason trial] until now, so far as I know, has taken the position that the President himself is absolutely immune from subpoena by anyone . . .” Rehnquist Memorandum at 3. Of course, taking a position is not the same thing as establishing that the position is correct.

OLC’s current justification for the president’s immunity consists of little more than the bare assertion that “Congress may no more summon the President to a congressional committee room than the President may command Members of Congress to appear at the White House.” 5-20-19 OLC Opinion at 1. I have three observations about this assertion. First, it should be noted that it is more modest than the position stated by Rehnquist in 1971. The latter was that the president was immune from “subpoena by anyone.” OLC today refers only to subpoena by Congress, although its reasoning, premised on the fact that the “President stands at the head of a co-equal branch of government,” would seem to apply equally to judicial subpoenas. See 5-20-19 OLC Opinion at 4. By confining its claim, OLC avoids the need to deal with the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), which suggests that “even the President may not be absolutely immune from compulsory process more generally.” Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers, 558 F.Supp.2d 53, __ (2008).

Second, as others have noted, the attempt to equate congressional and presidential subpoena authority makes no sense because the president has no subpoena authority and thus lacks the power to command anyone (other than, I suppose, his subordinates) to appear at the White House. The president’s inability to compel the appearance of members of the Congress therefore says nothing about the subpoena authority of congressional committees.

Third, the comparison makes even less sense when one considers that members of Congress have no immunity from subpoenas themselves. Representatives and senators have been required to appear and testify in many types of proceedings despite the existence of an express constitutional privilege against arrest which was designed to allow them to carry out their legislative duties without interruption while Congress is in session. Though no less authorities than Thomas Jefferson and Joseph Story believed this provision gave members a (temporary) immunity from subpoenas ad testificandum, this position has never been accepted by the courts. See 2 Deschler’s Precedents of the U.S. House of Representatives 817 (“The rulings of the courts, both state and federal, have uniformly expressed the principle that a summons or subpena is not an arrest, and is not precluded by the Constitution.”). Similarly, although members have a privilege against being questioned about legislative activities under the Speech or Debate Clause, this does not equate to an absolute testimonial immunity or the right to refuse to appear when subpoenaed. See Miers, 558 F.Supp.2d at __ (“Members cannot simply assert, without more, that the Speech or Debate Clause shields their activities and thereby preclude all further inquiry.”) Thus, OLC’s comparison would seem to support, rather than refute, the president’s amenability to subpoena. Id.

Interestingly, while OLC relies on many of its prior memoranda in support of its contention that presidential advisers have absolute testimonial immunity, it fails to mention a 1973 memorandum which expresses doubt as to whether even the president himself has such immunity. After discussing the dispute between Chief Justice Marshall and President Jefferson over whether the latter could be required to give evidence in the Aaron Burr treason trial, the memorandum notes that “[m]odern legal discussion of the power of the courts to subpoena the President still adheres to Chief Justice Marshall’s view that the President is not exempt from judicial process, in particular the judicial power compel anyone to give testimony.” Memorandum from Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Presidential Amenability to Judicial Subpoenas 5 (June 25, 1973) (available in OLC FOIA electronic reading room) (hereinafter “Dixon memorandum”). It goes on to note that it is “questionable whether there is adequate precedent for the proposition that the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers precludes vel non the issuance of judicial subpoenas to the President.” Dixon Memorandum at 7.

The same memorandum suggests that any presidential immunity or protection against subpoenas may be limited in cases of alleged official wrongdoing:

A special situation exists with respect to claims of privilege where charges of official wrongdoings are concerned. There appears to be no pertinent precedent as to whether a President can claim privilege in judicial proceedings in that situation. There have been, however, several statements made by Presidents and Attorneys General that privilege will not be invoked vis-a-vis Congress where charges of official wrongdoing are involved. Significantly those statements have usually been made [in the context of] the Congressional power of impeachment.

Dixon Memorandum at 12 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Dixon concludes that “the subpoenaing of a President involves a number of complex issues depending on the circumstances in which and the purposes for which the subpoena is issued.” Dixon Memorandum at 13. For example, “it could be argued that a President will not or cannot claim privilege where official misconduct is the subject matter of grand jury proceedings or of a criminal prosecution.” Id. Moreover, “it may well be that a President will not or even may not claim privilege where Congress performs its specific constitutional responsibilities in the field of impeachment.” Id. These observations, it should be noted, precede the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Nixon, which only bolsters Dixon’s skepticism regarding the president’s absolute immunity from subpoena.

While OLC’s position on presidential testimonial immunity has little support in judicial precedent or legal doctrine, historical practice is more favorable. As Andy Wright details here, presidents rarely have testified in judicial or congressional proceedings and when they have done so it is generally with an accommodation to indicate the voluntariness of their cooperation. Perhaps most strikingly, neither Andrew Johnson nor Bill Clinton testified in their impeachment trials, nor did Nixon testify in the House Judiciary Committee inquiry regarding his impeachment. I would summarize this history as reflecting a strong constitutional convention against forcing a president to testify in any but the most compelling circumstances.

All this being said, there is no direct judicial precedent on the question of whether a sitting president is entitled to absolute testimonial immunity.  I tend to agree with Steve Vladeck and Ben Wittes that it is more likely than not that the Supreme Court would reject a claim of such immunity, but I also agree with them that “it is not a sure thing, and the President has plausible arguments available to him that a court would have to work through before enforcing a subpoena for his testimony.” There is particular uncertainty as to how newer members of the Court may view the president’s claim of absolute testimonial immunity (and some reason to believe that Justice Kavanaugh, in particular, may be sympathetic to such a claim). Continue reading “Does the President Enjoy Absolute Testimonial Immunity?”

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OLC’s Evolving Position on Testimonial Immunity

In this post I will look at OLC’s claim that its advice on testimonial immunity of senior presidential advisers has been consistent “for nearly five decades.” See 5-20-19 OLC Opinion at 1. As we saw in my first post, since the 1940s the executive branch has generally resisted congressional demands for testimony from such advisers, but on a number of occasions it has permitted these advisers to testify in open congressional hearings and on other occasions it has agreed or offered to provide information from these advisers in alternative ways. Until the mid to late-1990s, the executive branch’s position on this subject was not presented to Congress as an assertion of absolute constitutional immunity, but more like the prophylactic rule described in my last post. Moreover, when OLC’s internal memoranda from this time period are scrutinized (to the extent they are available), they are compatible with this more modest interpretation of its position.

It was not until the Clinton administration that OLC articulated a formal and definitive defense of the proposition that senior presidential advisers are constitutionally immune from compelled congressional testimony. Even then, OLC seems to have accepted this proposition without any serious legal analysis and, in particular, without any consideration of important developments in the case law since Assistant Attorney General William Rehnquist first casually suggested it in 1971. Continue reading “OLC’s Evolving Position on Testimonial Immunity”

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OLC’s Law Office History of Testimonial Immunity

On May 20, 2019, the Office of Legal Counsel released an opinion entitled “Testimonial Immunity Before Congress of the Former Counsel to the President,” in which OLC concludes that former White House counsel Don McGahn is constitutionally immune from being required to appear, much less testify, before the House Judiciary Committee. Before analyzing OLC’s substantive argument, I want to address two factual assertions it makes about historical practice and its own legal advice regarding this issue.

OLC makes two basic claims. First, it contends that executive branch practice “at least since the Truman Administration” provides a “strong historical foundation for the Executive Branch’s position that Congress may not compel the President’s senior advisers to appear and testify.” Second, it asserts that “for nearly five decades” the Justice Department has maintained that “Congress may not constitutionally compel the President’s senior advisers to testify about their official duties.”

One might question the relevance of these assertions even if they were true. Neither the executive branch’s unilateral practice of objecting to congressional testimony by White House officials nor its internal opinions regarding the constitutional basis for this practice would constitute authority binding on the other branches, particularly in the absence of any evidence or even allegation of congressional acquiescence. Nevertheless, it is worth scrutinizing OLC’s claims if for no other reason than that it seems to place a great deal of reliance on them. Perhaps this is because, as Judge Bates observed in 2008, the only authority offered by the executive branch for the proposition that White House officials enjoy testimonial immunity is OLC’s prior opinions on the subject.

That being said, the historical record does not support either of OLC’s claims. Today we will look at the evidence with regard to OLC’s description of the historical record. In a future post we will look at its claims regarding its prior advice.

Practice Prior to the Nixon Administration. The Executive Office of the President dates back only to the 1930s, and OLC maintains that since that time “the long-standing policy has been to decline invitations for voluntary appearances and to resist congressional subpoenas for involuntary ones” with respect to White House officials.

OLC has identified only six instances in which White House officials attempted to refuse congressional invitations or demands for testimony during the period prior to the Nixon administration. In three of these cases, the official in question ultimately agreed to testify as the result of political or legal pressure (or both) exerted by Congress.

[Note: CRS has identified a couple of additional instances during the 1940s where White House officials testified regarding allegations they misused their positions for personal gain, but it is not apparent there was any objection in those cases. See CRS Report on Presidential Advisers’ Testimony Before Congressional Committees: An Overview 7-8 (Apr. 10, 2007).]

First, in 1944 during the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration, a Senate subcommittee subpoenaed a presidential aide, Jonathan Daniels, to testify about his reported attempts to compel the head of the Rural Electrification Administration to resign. The aide appeared but refused to testify based on his confidential relationship with the president. After the subcommittee unanimously recommended Daniels be held in contempt, the aide wrote to the subcommittee that he had conferred with the president, who had decided his testimony would not be contrary to the public interest, and was therefore willing to return to the Hill and testify.

A second instance (which is not mentioned in OLC’s May 20 opinion but comes from earlier OLC discussions of this period) concerns Donald Dawson, an aide to President Truman, who was asked in 1951 to testify before a Senate subcommittee investigating the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Truman “reluctantly” gave permission to Dawson to testify because the inquiry included allegations of wrongdoing against Dawson and Truman wished to give the aide an opportunity to clear his name.

Finally, in 1958 during the Eisenhower administration, the president’s chief of staff, Sherman Adams, testified (with the president’s approval) before a House subcommittee regarding allegations he had improperly interfered with administrative proceedings for the benefit of a New England industrialist with whom he had a longstanding friendship.

On the other hand, OLC identifies three instances in which presidential advisers successfully refused to testify before Congress during this period. One concerned John Steelman, an aide to President Truman, who in 1948 refused subpoenas to testify before a House subcommittee about his communications with Truman regarding administration of the Taft-Hartley Act during a strike. Another also involved Sherman Adams, who in 1955 successfully refused an invitation from a Senate subcommittee to testify regarding a contract between the Atomic Energy Commission and two power companies. Finally, in 1968 an aide to President Lyndon Johnson, W. DeVier Pierson, declined to testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding allegations that Associate Justice Abe Fortas, whose nomination to become chief justice was pending, had inappropriately been involved in drafting certain legislation while serving on the Supreme Court.

It is difficult to see how this history shows anything other than the fact that the White House generally prefers that its staff not testify before Congress. Indeed, in a 1971 internal memorandum (about which more later), Assistant Attorney General William Rehnquist described the practice during this period as “erratic” and noted that “[t]hese precedents are obviously quite inconclusive.” See Memorandum for John D. Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Power of Congressional Committee to Compel Testimony of “White House Staff” 4, 6 (Feb. 5, 1971) (“Rehnquist Memorandum”). This would seem to directly contradict OLC’s current assertion that these “precedents” provide a “strong historical foundation” for its constitutional theory.

Practice Since the Nixon Administration. While the  pre-Nixon history provides little or no support for OLC’s position, at least its description of that history appears to be fair. On the other hand, its description of the later history suffers from egregious cherry-picking. Although OLC acknowledges that its examples are “not exhaustive,” it implies that they fairly represent the practice during this period. This is not so.

Nixon administration. OLC cites the refusal of Peter Flanigan, a White House aide, to testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding the nomination of Richard Kleindienst to be attorney general. Somehow it fails to mention that the White House relented within a few days and that Flanigan both appeared before the committee and answered written questions for the record. See Louis Fisher, The Politics of Executive Privilege 73 (2004).

Carter administration. OLC cites two examples of Carter White House aides declining to appear in public congressional hearings, but it neglects to mention that both the White House counsel and national security adviser appeared at congressional hearings regarding alleged misconduct by the president’s brother. Fisher, supra, at 202.

Reagan administration. OLC cites the refusal of the White House counsel to appear in person before a congressional committee (he did agree to answer written questions) regarding allegations of corruption against the secretary of labor. It does not mention President Reagan’s directive to all administration officials to cooperate with the congressional investigation of Iran-Contra, which resulted in a number of former White House officials testifying before Congress. Fisher, supra, at 62-64, 202.

Clinton administration. OLC cites President Clinton’s directive to Beth Nolan, counsel to the president, not to testify before a House committee regarding a clemency decision, but it does not mention that Nolan, along with a number of other former White House aides, testified before the same committee regarding Clinton’s subsequent pardons. Fisher, supra, at 219. It also overlooks the fact that “[a] series of congressional investigations throughout the Clinton years required a large number of White House aides to testify about procedures and actions involving contacts with the Treasury Department, the dismissals of employees in the Travel Office, Whitewater, and access to FBI files.” Fisher, supra, at 203.

Even where OLC acknowledges that presidential  aides have testified, it downplays the significance of these facts. For example, OLC acknowledges in a footnote that during Watergate President Nixon allowed current and former White House officials to appear before Congress, first in closed session and then later in open hearings. However, OLC interprets such occurrences as merely “accommodations” to Congress, as opposed to evidence that executive branch practice with respect to congressional testimony by presidential advisers has been inconsistent, non-absolute, or both. This approach renders OLC’s position non-falsifiable since it only counts evidence that supports it.

Conclusion

Rather than constituting a “strong historical foundation” for OLC’s claim of absolute immunity, the evidence supports Lou Fisher’s conclusion that while Congress does not call White House officials to testify regarding routine oversight matters, it does do so when the circumstances warrant, particularly in cases where these officials have an operational role or are fact witnesses to alleged misconduct. See Fisher, supra, at 226-227. Under these conditions White House officials have in fact testified, “and in large numbers.” Id. at 199; see also CRS Report, supra, at 7-20.

 

 

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Why the Mazars and New York Bank Cases are Moving So Fast, and Why Others Will Not

On Monday, May 20, 2019, Judge Mehta dismissed Trump v. Committee on Oversight and Reform, No. 19-civ-01136 (D.D.C.). The judge’s ruling came just four weeks after President Trump (in his personal capacity) and several of his businesses filed suit to enjoin enforcement of a congressional subpoena to Mazars, an accounting firm that had worked for the Trump companies.  This quick resolution may have surprised some observers because legal experts have been predicting that legal fights between the administration and Congress are likely to drag on for many months if not years and could well be still in litigation when this congress expires in January 2021.

It is important to understand, however, that the Mazars case (and the case in New York which Trump seeks to block congressional subpoena to banks for his financial records) are in a very different procedural posture from other ongoing information disputes (such as those over the Mueller report and related documents, tax returns, or the testimony of current or former administration officials). Mazars and the New York banks are third parties that have indicated they will comply with the congressional subpoenas unless ordered to do otherwise by a court. Therefore, it is Trump’s legal team which needs judicial intervention to alter the status quo, whereas in the other disputes Congress will likely be in the position of asking for judicial assistance.

In the Mazar and New York bank cases, Trump’s legal team initially asked for emergency judicial relief (i.e., a TRO) in order to prevent the cases from becoming moot by virtue of the third parties complying with the subpoenas. In both cases, however, the House Counsel’s office agreed to postpone the return date for the subpoenas until 7 days after a district court ruling on the motion for a preliminary injunction, thereby rendering it unnecessary to have a TRO. As part of the same agreement, the parties agreed to an expedited schedule for briefing and oral argument (which both courts accepted and entered as orders).

As the result of that agreement, Trump’s team was now in the position of nominally seeking expedited relief (a preliminary injunction), but actually no longer needing it so long as the court did not rule on the preliminary injunction motion. This anomaly presented itself when Judge Mehta proposed consolidating the preliminary injunction hearing with a final trial on the merits. Trump’s lawyers objected, saying that they needed more time to prepare for such a trial, and suggesting that instead the preliminary injunction hearing could be pushed back so the record could be fully developed. The House oversight committee, in contrast, had no objection to the proposed consolidation, but emphasized that the preliminary injunction hearing should go on as scheduled regardless.

Judge Mehta did in fact consolidate the merits trial with the preliminary injunction, but it is not clear this mattered much. If the judge had simply denied the preliminary injunction, Mazars would have been expected to comply with the subpoena after 7 days regardless. Presumably Trump’s lawyers would have asked for the judge to stay his ruling until a final merits decision, but they would have been in no better posture (and arguably somewhat worse) than they were as a result of the consolidation. Following the court’s ruling against them on both the preliminary injunction and the merits, they asked the court for a stay, which was denied. Now the plaintiffs’ only option is to obtain a stay from the D.C. Circuit so as to prevent the case from becoming moot before the appellate court can hear it. Had the case not been consolidated, they probably could have sought such relief from the appellate court, but it might have been even harder to get the court to intervene on a matter that was still before the district court (admittedly I am just guessing about this).

In any event, unless the D.C. Circuit issues a stay of the district court’s ruling, Mazars will be required to comply with the subpoena as early as next week. If Judge Ramos, who is presiding over Trump v. Deutsche Bank, No. 1:19-cv-03826 (SDNY) and is hearing argument today,  similarly denies Trump’s preliminary injunction motion, that case could also end within a week of the ruling unless either the district court or the Second Circuit issue a stay.

None of the other information disputes currently percolating are likely to move anywhere nearly as quickly as this. If cases are brought directly against the administration (eg, for the Mueller report or Trump’s tax returns), the congressional plaintiff will not be able to seek expedited relief (a TRO or preliminary injunction) since it will be seeking to change, not preserve, the status quo. Moreover, the executive branch defendant will have little incentive to agree to an expedited briefing or argument.

Exactly how fast a case may move at the district court level will depend on a number of factors, including the complexity of the legal issues and whether any discovery or document review is necessary to resolve the matter (going through the 1.4 million pages of Mueller documents to determine the applicability of different executive privilege claims, for example, could take a very long time). But even a case that presents a relatively straightforward legal issue is likely to take a few months with a normal briefing and argument schedule. In the Miers case, for example, Judge Bates issued his ruling in favor of the House Judiciary Committee about 4 and a half months after the action was filed.

Of course, the district court has a great deal of discretion with regard to scheduling matters. Judge Mehta clearly believed that it was important to expedite the Mazars case (even going so far as to consolidate the merits trial on his own initiative). Even there, though, the court’s reasons for acting quickly were based in part on the fact that it was being asked to interfere with the functioning of a coordinate branch of government. A district court might be less inclined to act quickly when it is being asked by the legislative branch to order the executive branch to turn over information.

Furthermore, however quickly the district court decides the case, the executive branch still has the right to appeal that decision, to seek rehearing en banc of any appellate decision, and ultimately to petition the Supreme Court for review. Even assuming that neither the en banc court nor the Supreme Court decide to hear the case, it is difficult to imagine the full process being complete in much less than a year.

One category of case that might be resolved more quickly would be enforcement actions by Congress against former executive officials like Don McGahn. These individuals are in a situation somewhat analogous to third parties like Mazars, in that they do not have (or purport not to have) a position or interest in whether or not they comply with the subpoena. On the other hand, they do purport to have an obligation to follow the president’s instructions with regard to asserting executive privilege (though opinions differ on whether such an obligation exists).

At any rate, if a district court orders such a former official to comply with a congressional subpoena, the    former official may not wish to risk possible contempt of court by continuing to defy the subpoena. Even if the Justice Department is able to obtain a stay from the district court or the court of appeals, the former official could decide that the district court’s decision is sufficient to release him from any further obligation not to comply. Thus, these cases could be resolved more quickly than direct suits against the executive branch, though probably not as quickly as the Mazars and New York bank cases.

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Resources on Congressional Oversight and Executive-Legislative Information Disputes

As there appears to a current demand for resources on congressional oversight, executive privilege and the process for resolving executive-legislative disputes over information, I thought I would post a few suggestions as to places to look for such materials. First, there is this Congressional Investigations Research Page hosted by Georgetown Law (hat tip: Andy Wright). Second, the Congressional Oversight Manual has a list of selected readings starting at page 136. Third, Daniel Schuman has been collecting resources on the congressional oversight and subpoena power, particularly reform proposals.

Finally, here is a link to a 2002 brief filed by BLAG in Waxman v. Evans, which describes in some detail how executive-legislative information disputes have been resolved historically. To the best of my knowledge, this document has not previously been available on line.

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A Better Way to Enforce Congressional Subpoenas?

In the course of writing the piece on enforcement of congressional subpoenas that I mentioned yesterday, I was looking for a copy of the House GOP white paper “A Better Way: Our Vision for a Confident America (The Constitution),” which was issued on June 16, 2016. At this time, of course, the Republican controlled Congress had experienced years of frustration in attempting to get information from the Obama administration (and, one has to imagine, was anticipating more of the same in a Hillary Clinton administration). As it turns out, finding a copy of this document online is more difficult than one would expect. Fortunately, I have located a hard copy in my files and post a link here for anyone who is interested (you’re welcome).

Among the proposals suggested by House Republicans in this paper was “expedited access to federal courts to enforce subpoenas” through legislation “requiring the executive branch to comply with deadlines in congressional subpoenas” and “providing a process for expedited court review when the House or Senate decides to bring litigation to enforce a committee subpoena, including expedited review by a three-judge panel at the district court level with immediate appeal to the Supreme Court.” These ideas would be incorporated into H.R. 4010, introduced by Rep. Darrell Issa, which passed the House in 2017 during the first session of the 115th congress but never received a vote in the Senate.

The white paper made two additional legislative proposals that did not make it into Issa’s legislation (at least in its final form). The first was to “clarify[] the nondiscretionary duty of a U.S. attorney to present a certified order for criminal contempt to a grand jury.” The second was to “statutorily eliminat[e] any privileges asserted by the executive branch when used against a congressional request for information.” Both of these would have been vigorously opposed by OLC and the executive branch on constitutional as well as policy grounds.

 

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Just Security Piece on Enforcement of Congressional Subpoenas

As I have mentioned before, I have proposed a reform to House rules that would facilitate enforcement of committee subpoenas to the executive branch. Just Security has now published this piece in which I explain the justification for the rule and how it would work using the example of the House Judiciary committee’s efforts to obtain the Mueller report and underlying documents.