Point of Order - A Discussion of Congressional Legal Issues

November 25, 2008

The House Files an Amicus Brief in the Renzi Case

The House Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (which consists of the Speaker, the Majority and Minority Leaders, and the Majority and Minority Whips) has filed an amicus brief in the Renzi case. BLAG argues that the Department of Justice committed “clear violations of the Speech or Debate Clause” in connection with the wiretap of Congressman Renzi’s cell phone and in presenting evidence to the original grand jury that indicted Renzi (a new grand jury has since issued a superseding indictment).

As a consequence of these violations, BLAG contends that the court should “suppress all evidence secured as a direct or indirect result of the wiretap.” It also maintains that the court should dismiss those portions of the superseding indictment (Counts 1-27 and portions of Count 42) which relate to Congressman Renzi’s involvement with private parties regarding legislative land exchanges “unless the Court, after a thorough review of all materials presented to the second grand jury, determines that the Department managed to extract completely all Speech or Debate material and all information derived from its earlier violations from its presentation to the second grand jury.”

In my next post I will analyze the House’s arguments relating to the presentation of evidence to the grand jury.

November 12, 2008

The Government Responds to Renzi’s Speech or Debate Motion

The prosecution has responded to Congressman Renzi’s motion to dismiss the indictment based on the Speech or Debate Clause. The most important question presented is whether Speech or Debate applies to Renzi’s communications with two outside groups—Resolution Copper and the Aries Group—regarding land exchange legislation the groups were seeking. (There are also significant Speech or Debate issues relating to how the government gathered some of the evidence in the case, but these are not the subject of today’s post).

Renzi contends that these communications are an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings. Specifically, “[e]xtensive negotiations between the private landholder and the Member (or Members) of Congress are an essential and integral predicate to a successful land exchange.” Renzi Motion at 17.

The prosecution’s response is somewhat complicated. At the outset, the government relies (as expected) on the Supreme Court’s statement in Helstoski that “[a] promise to deliver a speech, to vote or to solicit votes at some future date is not ‘speech or debate.’ Likewise, a promise to introduce a bill is not a legislative act.”

However, rather than focusing solely on the fact that Renzi’s communications with Resolution Copper and the Aries Group related to future legislation, the government also emphasizes that these communications were part and parcel of Renzi’s alleged extortion scheme:

Renzi thus made promises—first to Resolution Copper and later to the Aries Group—to vote and solicit other votes for the respective land swap proposals in return for the purchase of the Sandlin property. . . . These promises for future votes were not legislative acts. . . . Renzi’s promises were integral to his broader acts of extortion against Resolution Copper and the Aries Group, acts which find no protection in Speech or Debate jurisprudence.

Government Response at 7.

Interestingly, the government concedes that some of the documents presented to the grand jury were protected legislative material. Government Response at 12 n.8. These documents evidently consist of internal congressional emails discussing and transmitting drafts of the land exchange legislation. By acknowledging that these emails are part of the legislative process, the government implicitly concedes that the drafting of legislation is protected activity.

On the other hand, the prosecution apparently maintains that when such internal congressional emails were forwarded to outside parties, they lost their protected status. It contends that “Renzi clearly consented to the distribution of emails and letters to third parties, and that consent takes those materials outside the protection of United States v. Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2113, 497 F.3d 654, 663 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 1738 (2008), even were those materials to fall within the definition of ‘speech or debate. . . . ’” Government Response at 13.

This aspect of the prosecution’s argument, at least, makes no sense. Renzi’s distribution of legislative materials to third parties enables the government to obtain those materials from the third parties without violating the Speech or Debate Clause, but it doesn’t have any bearing on whether the materials can be introduced as evidence against Renzi. The prosecution cannot use a document created or received by a third party if the document evidences a legislative act any more than it could have a third party testify about how Renzi voted.

What about the government’s contention that Renzi’s communications with Resolution Copper and the Aries Group were unprotected? If Renzi had told these groups that he would support the proposed legislation in exchange for a payment of money to Sandlin, such communication would clearly be unprotected under Helstoski. But that is not what happened. Instead, Renzi told these groups that he would support the legislation only if the Sandlin property were included in the land exchange. Unlike a promise to support legislation in exchange for a bribe, this statement would seem to be a facially legitimate part of the legislative process.

Of course, one might argue, as the government does, that conversations with lobbyists or other outside parties are not an integral part of the legislative process, and therefore do not merit protection under the Speech or Debate Clause. However, there are two difficulties with that position. First, there is authority in the Ninth Circuit, Miller v. Transamerican Press, to the effect that Speech or Debate protects a Congressman’s source of information from outside parties such as constituents or confidential informants.

Second, the process of drafting land exchange legislation would seem to necessarily involve communications with the private landowners who are to be exchanging land with the United States. Thus, as Renzi argues, these particular communications ought to be viewed as an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members develop land exchange legislation, even if communications with interested parties about other types of legislation might not be.

Unlike the Stevens and Jefferson cases, which involve legislative matters only tangentially, the Renzi fact pattern goes to the very heart of open issues in Speech or Debate jurisprudence. This is a case that could very well end up in the Supreme Court.

November 7, 2008

A Roadmap for the Stevens Expulsion

Here is my proposal for a principled resolution of the Stevens matter.

1. The first question that should be addressed is whether Stevens’s underlying conduct, independent of the fact of his conviction, warrants expulsion. I suspect that the Senate’s answer to this question would be no. In essence, the case against Stevens was that he received benefits which he knew or should have known were gifts, and that he failed to report them. The Senate would most likely not see this as something that should be treated as a criminal matter, and certainly not the type of corruption that would merit the ultimate sanction of expulsion.

2. If the answer to the first question is no, what role should the fact of Stevens’s conviction play in the Senate’s deliberations? If the underlying conduct does not warrant expulsion, it would seem that the jury’s verdict, standing alone, would not change this conclusion. Therefore, the Senate should not expel Stevens simply for being a “convicted felon.”

3. If the answer to the first question is yes, the Senate must then consider what weight to give to the fact of Stevens’s re-election. While I do not believe that his re-election deprives the Senate of the power to expel, constitutional considerations, supported by longstanding precedent and practice in both Houses, suggests that this power must be used with extreme caution in cases where the electorate has acted with knowledge of the misconduct. The Senate must therefore decide whether Stevens’s conduct was so egregious as to permit it to override the will of the voters. If the answer is yes, the Senate may proceed to immediate expulsion. For reasons indicated earlier, however, the answer in all likelihood would be no.

(It has been suggested that some voters who supported Stevens did not do so because they wanted him to be in office, but because they wanted to keep the seat in Republican control. While this may or may not be true, I don’t think it should play a role in the Senate’s decision. Constituents vote for all kinds of reasons, and the Senate should not be in the business of attempting to discern the motives of groups of voters in particular elections).

4. If the Senate decides that immediate expulsion is not warranted (either because it is not justified by the underlying conduct or because of the need to defer to the will of the voters), it still must decide what to do in the event that Stevens is required to report to prison. Because a Senator cannot perform his legislative and representational duties while in prison, the Senate would be justified in expelling him under those circumstances. On the other hand, one might argue that if the prison sentence were very short, or if Stevens had not exhausted his appeals, the Senate should continue to defer expulsion.

5. Even if Stevens receives a substantial prison sentence and his appeals are rejected, there is one additional issue that the Senate should consider before voting to expel. Because the Constitution places the decision on whether to expel a Member in the Congress, not in the judicial branch, the Senate should not simply act as a rubber stamp on the decision made by the jury and court.

Instead, the Senate should consider whether Stevens’s conviction was consistent with the rights and privileges of the Senate. This is a different question than whether the Senate would have reached the same result as the jury on the evidence presented at trial, or whether there was some procedural error in the trial. Instead, the question should be whether the prosecution or trial violated the separation of powers or the Senate’s autonomy by, for example, relying on evidence protected by the Speech or Debate Clause or improperly construing the Senate’s rules. The Senate might also consider the issue of prosecutorial misconduct in this connection. Only if the Senate is persuaded that the conviction was consistent with its rights and privileges should it proceed to expel Stevens.

November 6, 2008

More on a Stevens Expulsion

Much discussion continues on whether the Senate can or will expel Senator Stevens. Several Senators, including Majority Leader Reid, have suggested that expulsion is a virtual certainty. Minority Leader McConnell, on the other hand, has indicated that Stevens should be given a chance to pursue his appeal before expulsion, leaving open the question of what happens should Stevens be required to report to prison while his appeal is still pending.

Stan Brand, the former General Counsel of the House, is quoted today as saying that “given the voter condonation of [Stevens’s] conduct, I think there are serious [constitutional] questions about whether they could expel him.”

Thus, possible resolutions range from immediate expulsion without regard to what might happen in the appeals process, on the one hand, to respecting the will of the voters and allowing Stevens to remain in the Senate without regard to whether he is required to serve time in prison, on the other. In my judgment, the proper course is somewhere in the middle, close to what Senator McConnell has suggested.

I do not believe that the re-election of Senator Stevens constitutes a jurisdictional bar to Senate expulsion in this matter. Although there is some Senate precedent to support such a position, the better view would be that the Senate retains the constitutional power of expulsion even for conduct known to the voters at the time of re-election.

Nevertheless, in my view the fact of Stevens’s re-election is more than merely a “political” issue as suggested in Professor Rick Hasen’s Election Law Blog today. To my mind, this implies that the Senate’s constitutional authority is unconstrained by the fact of the voters’ verdict, and the only issue is whether there would be some sort of political fallout for Senators who vote for or against expulsion. On the contrary, I believe that the Senate has a constitutional obligation, supported by its own precedents (and similar precedents in the House), to consider the decision of Alaska voters as a factor weighing heavily against expulsion.

Professor Hasen cites a CRS report to the effect that while each House of Congress has the authority to expel for misconduct known to the voters at the time of election, “it has been a general practice and policy in Congress not to expel a Member for past offenses if the electorate knew of the offenses involved, and still chose to elect or reelect that individual as their Representative or Senator in Congress.” (emphasis in original).

True enough as far as it goes, but it should not be inferred that this policy is one that each House could simply ignore or change. As one of the precedents cited by the CRS report explains, the policy is one of constitutional dimension:

As a matter of sound policy, this extraordinary prerogative of the House, in our judgment, should be exercised only in extreme cases and always with great caution and after due circumspection, and should be invoked with greater caution where the acts of misconduct complained of had become public previous to and were generally known at the time of the Member’s election. To exercise such power in that instance the House might abuse its high prerogative, and in our opinion might exceed the just limitations of its constitutional authority by seeking to substitute its own standards and ideals for the standards and ideals of the constituency of the Member who had deliberately chosen him to be their Representative. The effect of such a policy would tend not to preserve but to undermine and destroy representative government.

VI Cannon’s Precedents, § 398 (emphasis added).

In my next post, I will propose how the Senate might think about the issue of whether Stevens should be expelled.

November 2, 2008

Senators Inouye and Reid Debate the Stevens Case

Roll Call reports the following debate between Senators Inouye and Reid:

In a statement released by the Stevens campaign, Inouye argues that his longtime friend will be seated as a Member of the Senate next year if re elected and that he believes the felony convictions will be overturned.

“As the Senate has done in every other instance in its long 220-year history, I am absolutely confident that Ted Stevens will be sworn into the Senate while he appeals this unjust verdict, I am certain that this decision in Washington, D.C., will be overturned on appeal,” Inouye said.

But Reid rejected that reading of Senate history and chastised Stevens for using his friend in a political campaign.

“While I respect the opinion of Senator Daniel Inouye, the reality is that a convicted felon is not going to be able to serve in the United States Senate. And as precedent shows us, Senator Stevens will face an ethics committee investigation and expulsion, regardless of his appeals process,” Reid said.

Lets be clear here. If Stevens is re-elected, he will be seated as Member of the Senate. He meets the constitutional qualifications (he has been a citizen for nine years, is an inhabitant of Alaska and is way more than thirty years old) and thus the Senate has no power to exclude him. So Senator Inouye is certainly correct about that.

As for Senator Reid’s claim that “precedent” shows that Stevens will face expulsion regardless of what happens with his appeal, this is questionable. Given that no Senator has ever been expelled under circumstances remotely comparable, one certainly cannot claim that precedent demands Stevens’s expulsion. As I have pointed out, the most relevant precedent is the Harrison Williams case, which suggests that the Senate would allow Stevens the opportunity to seek post-trial relief up to the point that he would actually face the prospect of going to prison.

The first thing that will happen, of course, is that the Senate Ethics Committee will commence an inquiry and review the evidence. As Rob Walker, former staff director of the committee, has explained, the committee will likely rely heavily on the trial transcript, but also must give Stevens and his counsel an opportunity to present evidence and argument in defense of the charges. The members of the Committee are then required to make an independent judgment as to whether Stevens is guilty of the criminal charges and/or violations of any Senate rules.

In reality, however, the members of the Committee (and ultimately the Senate as a whole) are likely to be less concerned with the evidence than with the difficulty of squaring their decision with two external judgments that point in opposite directions (1) the jury verdict of guilty and (2) the (hypothetical) decision of Alaska voters to return Stevens to the Senate.

It is difficult to say at this juncture how the Committee or the Senate would resolve this tension. In principle, the Senate should make an independent judgment as to whether the offenses established by the evidence warrant expulsion. Precedent, at least in the legal sense, does not tell us much about what judgment the Senate should make. It seems most likely, however, that the Senate would follow the practice in the Williams matter and allow Stevens the opportunity to pursue post-trial remedies.

What happens if Stevens cannot avoid going to prison, but still has a chance of getting his conviction overturned on appeal? Most likely, he would resign, but if he did not, the Senate would probably expel him. This conclusion is dictated less by precedent than by the assumption that Senators would not be comfortable with the idea of a sitting Senator sitting in jail.

November 1, 2008

Washington Post Article on Speech or Debate

The Washington Post has a front page article today, above the fold, today on the Speech or Debate clause, which the reporter explains, “is increasingly being used by lawmakers as a shield in public corruption investigations, frustrating investigators even as the FBI attempts to police wrongdoing at a pace not seen since the Watergate scandal.”

One interesting revelation of the article is that the House Counsel’s office is seeking to file an amicus brief on behalf of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group in the Renzi case. As I have noted, the government’s position in the Renzi case would inappropriately limit the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause. Thus, it is not surprising that the House Counsel’s office would want to make its views known (though it is somewhat surprising that the BLAG was willing to intervene in such a politically controversial matter).

October 28, 2008

A Seventeenth Amendment Issue in Alaska

Following Senator Stevens’s conviction yesterday, the Anchorage Daily News has spotlighted an interesting issue that would arise in the event Stevens were to resign. Evidently the Alaska Legislature passed a law in 2004 which allowed the Governor to make a temporary appointment to fill a Senate vacancy pending a special election to fill the seat. However, later in 2004 the voters approved a ballot initiative which purports to take away the temporary appointment power.

Under the Seventeenth Amendment, “the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.” The issue, then, is whether the power granted by the Seventeenth Amendment can be taken away from the state legislature by some other state authority, in this case the voters by ballot initiative.

I have not done exhaustive (or even tiring) research on the issue. It appears, though, that Supreme Court cases on state legislative action regarding the time, place and manner of federal elections would be relevant here. Although the Constitution provides that regulations on time, place and manner “shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof,” the Court has held that this does not pre-empt state constitutional provisions that limit a state legislature’s lawmaking authority, such as provisions that a billed passed by the legislature may be vetoed by the Governor, Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932), or may be negated by a referendum, Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916).

However, there is an important distinction between the Alaska situation and those considered in Smiley and Davis. In those cases the question was whether to give effect to a legislative action that, under state law, had never become legally effective. In Alaska, on the other hand, the question is whether to give effect to a ballot initiative, passed without any involvement of the legislature, and which supersedes a law previously passed by the legislature. In other words, Alaska case raises the novel (as far as I know) question of whether the powers delegated by the Seventeenth Amendment to the state “legislature” can be exercised without any involvement of the actual legislature.

October 27, 2008

Senator Stevens and the Senate Ethics Committee

Paul Blumenthal of the Sunlight Foundation poses the following questions: “The Alaska Daily News covers another aspect of the trial: what happens if Sen. Stevens is found guilty and then wins reelection? I have another question, what does the Senate Ethics Committee do if Sen. Stevens is acquitted?”

Lets begin with the easiest question: if Stevens is not re-elected, it is virtually certain that the Senate Ethics Committee will take no action, regardless of what happens with his trial. Both the Senate and the House have long taken the position that they lose jurisdiction over a member once he leaves office. There would be little time left for the Senate Ethics Committee to take any action against Stevens, even if it were inclined to do so.

A more difficult question arises if Stevens is acquitted and re-elected. In that case, the Senate Ethics Committee would be under pressure to take action, but Stevens’s lawyers and supporters would argue that the Committee should respect the verdict, not just of the jury but of the voters. There is a strong tradition, in both the House and Senate, of declining to take disciplinary action against members based on conduct that was known to the voters at the time of their election. Sometimes this principle has even been described as jurisdictional—for example, in the Fourth Congress a Senate Select Committee found that the Senate had no jurisdiction over accusations of fraud and perjury “alleged to have been committed before [the Senator’s] election to the Senate and were public knowledge.” J. Chafetz, Democracy’s Privileged Few 221 (2007). It is generally understood today, however, that this limitation is in the nature of a prudential restraint.

This principle would certainly counsel the Senate Ethics Committee against recommending Stevens’s expulsion, but it is less clear that it should prevent the Committee from taking or recommending lesser action. After all, the fact that the voters wanted Stevens to remain in the Senate would not necessarily mean that they want him to escape all punishment for his actions. Moreover, even if the Committee chose not to revisit the jury’s findings with regard to false statements by Stevens, it could still consider whether Stevens violated Senate rules. Indeed, even if the Committee accepted everything said by Stevens in his own defense as true, one could argue that it should find that his actions violated the letter and/or spirit of the gift rules.

The most difficult issue is what happens if Stevens is convicted and re-elected. While the principle of respecting the decision of the voters would weigh heavily against expulsion, there would also be a countervailing tradition that Members of Congress, when convicted, normally resign their offices. If Stevens were not to follow that tradition, the Committee would have to face a serious question of whether to expel him.

The most relevant precedent would seem to be the case of Senator Harrison Williams, who was convicted on bribery charges in 1980 after being videotaped agreeing to accept a bribe during the Abscam investigation. The Senate allowed Williams to remain in the Senate for more than a year while he pursued post-trial remedies. Some Senators thought expulsion was too harsh a remedy for Williams’s conduct. Eventually, however, the Senate scheduled a vote on expulsion; Williams chose to resign before the vote. As Dennis Thompson notes, “even in a case of almost pure individual corruption, it took unusually explicit evidence and confirmation provided by a criminal conviction to bring the Senate to the point of imposing its ultimate sanction. In most cases the accused’s motives are less evident and his colleagues’ judgment less severe.” D. Thompson, Ethics in Congress 105 (1995).

Based on the Williams precedent, it seems likely that Stevens would not be expelled at least until he had exhausted his post-trial options. If he was at the point of actually going to prison, however, the Senate would presumably expect him to resign. If he failed to do so, at that point the Senate would most likely proceed to expel him.

October 26, 2008

Gifts and Liabilities in the Stevens Jury Instructions

My last post discussed how the Stevens jury may be confused about the definition of a “reportable liability.” Today I will discuss a significant ambiguity in the jury instructions themselves.

The instructions reflect the fact that Stevens is charged with failing to report both gifts and liabilities. But nowhere do the instructions state, at least explicitly, that these are alternative theories. In other words, the indictment alleges that the various things of value Stevens received were either gifts or liabilities. A single thing of value, however, cannot be both a gift and a liability.

The jury instructions obliquely address this question. There are eight different instructions (Nos. 32, 43, 45, 51, 53, 55, 57 and 68) that deal with the need for the jury to reach a unanimous verdict. These instructions fall into three different categories. Instruction No. 32 deals with Count One, which alleges that Stevens concealed material facts on his financial disclosure forms (FDs) for each year from 2000 to 2006. The instruction states that “[i]n order to find that the government has met its burden to show that Senator Stevens concealed a specific alleged gift or liability, you must unanimously agree as to the specific gift or liability that Senator Stevens concealed and the specific Financial Disclosure Form on which the alleged concealment occurred.”

Instructions Nos. 43, 45, 51, 53, 55 and 57 deal with Counts Two through Seven, each of which alleges that Stevens made a false statement on his FD for a particular year from 2001 to 2006 (Count Two deals with 2001, Count Three with 2002, etc). Each instruction states “[i]n order to find that the government has met its burden to show that Senator Stevens made or caused a false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or representation when he filled out his [year in question] Financial Disclosure Form on [date in question], you must unanimously agree as to the statement or representation that was false, fictitious or fraudulent.”

Finally, Instruction No. 68 covers all counts, and states: “In order for your verdict to be unanimous, you must all agree that the government proved each element of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Senator Stevens has been charged with seven counts of making or causing false statements on his Financial Disclosure Forms. For some of the counts, the government has alleged more than one statement or representation, or more than one gift or liability. However, in order to return a guilty verdict on any count, you must unanimously agree on the specific false statement or representation and the specific gift or liability that Senator Stevens allegedly failed to disclose on his Financial Disclosure Form.”

I think I understand the rationale behind these instructions, but one can easily imagine the jury being confused as to the different and apparently inconsistent verbiage used. Presumably, though, the jurors will get the message that they must agree on both the particular thing of value Stevens should have reported and the year in which he should have reported it. In other words, it will not do if the jurors agree that Stevens should have reported Item A, but some believe that it should have been reported only on his 2004 FD and some believe it should have been reported only on his 2005 FD. Similarly, it will not do if the jurors all agree that Stevens should have reported something on his 2004 FD, but some believe that he was only required to report Item A and some believe that he was only required to report Item B.

It gets a little murkier, though, with respect to whether the jurors must agree on whether a particular item was a gift or a liability. Suppose, for example, the jurors all agree that Stevens was required to report Item A on his 2004 FD, but some believe that it should have been reported as a gift and some believe it should have been reported as a liability?

Read closely, it seems to me, the instructions for Counts Two through Seven require that the jurors agree on whether the particular item is a gift or a liability. This is because, as the jury instructions state, Stevens made separate “statements or representations” on each FD with respect to gifts and liabilities. If some of the jurors believe that Item A is a gift and some believe it is a liability, they would be unable to agree on which statement or representation was false and thus could not reach a unanimous verdict.

But what happens if the jurors who believe Item A is a gift also believe that, if it is not a gift, it is a liability? Or if some jurors believe that Item A is definitely either a gift or a liability, but are not sure which? It would seem that unless the jurors unanimously agree, beyond a reasonable doubt, on whether Item A is a gift or liability, it is logically impossible for them to agree on whether Stevens made a particular false statement or representation for purposes of Counts Two through Seven.

Count One may be different, though. That count does not charge Stevens with making a false statement or representation, but with concealing material facts. It may be that the jury could unanimously find that Stevens concealed a material fact, ie., his receipt of Item A, while they disagree as to whether Item A was a gift or a liability.

Maybe I am missing something (or maybe this is just the way the criminal justice system works), but it seems like asking an awful lot of the jury to puzzle this out on the instructions they have received.

October 25, 2008

Stevens Jury Confused on Liability Issue

According to The Hill, one of the questions asked by the Stevens jury this week involved the issue of reportable liabilities. The jury’s note to the judge asked him to “please clarify the liability cost as it is not readily clear in the Senate regulations.” It is interesting that the jury would be focused on liabilities, since everything I have read about the trial has dealt only with the question of whether Stevens received reportable gifts, and has not mentioned either evidence or argument on whether Stevens had reportable liabilities.

The judge evidently interpreted the jury’s question as meaning “what dollar amount triggers a reportable liability?” While this may be the most natural reading of the note, it is difficult to believe that the jury was confused on that point. Both the “Senate regulations” and the jury instructions (Instruction No. 66) make it crystal clear that the trigger is $10,000. If the jury doesn’t understand that, it is in real trouble.

Perhaps the jury is confused about how it should determine whether a liability is more than $10,000. Or perhaps it is confused about how to determine whether something is a reportable liability in the first place. The jury instructions do not provide any guidance on this, apparently leaving it up to the jury’s common sense. The jury’s note, moreover, suggests that it has been given copies of the “Senate regulations” (presumably referring to materials such as the Senate Ethics Manual and the instruction booklet for financial disclosure) and that it is trying to interpret these regulations for itself.

This strikes me as problematic. It would seem that interpreting the meaning of the term “liability” under the financial disclosure statute is a legal question for the court, not a factual question for the jury. In particular, as I have noted before, it is not at all obvious that an unpaid and unbilled debt for goods or services constitutes a “liability” within the meaning of the Senate rules. It should not be up to the jury, but to the court, to make the determination of whether the term “liability” extends so far. Moreover, to the extent that the Senate rules are ambiguous on this point, even the court is prohibited, under separation of powers principles, from interpreting them. The jury’s statement that the Senate regulations are not “readily clear” may itself provide ammunition to the defense for post-trial motions and/or appeal.

In the meantime, whatever the jury’s question, it will apparently have to muddle through without help. According to The Hill, the judge ultimately decided not to provide it with an answer.