Earlier this month the billionaire Leon Black sued the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (COGR) in federal district court, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief regarding two subpoenas that the committee had served upon him. The subpoenas related to COGR’s investigation into the activities of Jeffrey Epstein, who was a longtime business associate of Black’s.
COGR informed Black that its investigation included the following:
(i) the alleged mismanagement of the federal government’s investigation into Mr. Jeffrey Epstein and Ms. Ghislaine Maxwell, (ii) the circumstances and subsequent investigations of Epstein’s death, (iii) the operation of sex-trafficking rings and ways for the federal government to effectively combat them, (iv) ways in which Epstein and Maxwell sought to curry favor and exercise influence to protect their illegal activities, and (v) potential violations of ethics rules related to elected officials.
Although Black emphasizes that COGR’s jurisdiction (which he concedes is “broad”) is “not unbounded” and must be “in furtherance of a valid legislative purpose,” he does not appear to contest that the investigation described falls within COGR’s jurisdiction and has a valid legislative purpose. He seems to accept that COGR is legitimately investigating matters involving Epstein and Maxwell, “including federal investigative decisions, federal records, sex-trafficking enforcement, victim protection, potential ethics issues involving elected officials, and related legislative reforms.” Complaint ¶ 77.
Nor does Black appear to claim that it is unreasonable for the committee to view him as a source of potentially relevant information for its investigation. Black does not dispute COGR Chairman James Comer’s statement that “Leon Black had an extensive personal and financial relationship with Jeffrey Epstein spanning decades and paid him at least $158 million after Epstein became a registered sex offender.” These facts alone would warrant inquiring of Black to determine what information he might have regarding the subjects of the committee’s investigation.
Indeed, although Black does not expressly admit this, his complaint suggests he had no objection to COGR’s inquiring of him regarding his financial relationship with Epstein and any knowledge he may have had regarding Epstein’s sex-trafficking and other illicit activities. (He claims to have “no knowledge of any of Epstein’s heinous conduct. Complaint ¶ 38.) Black stresses that he voluntarily appeared for an interview by the committee staff and was prepared to answer questions about “his prior professional relationship with Epstein.” Complaint ¶ 28. However, Black informed the committee through counsel that he would “decline to answer questions relating solely to his personal life and the personal lives of third parties.” Complaint ¶ 26.
Specifically, Black does not want to provide any documents or testimony to the committee regarding the subject of non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) that he has entered into with various women. How many such NDAs exist? Black explicitly acknowledges the existence of two. Complaint ¶ 30. He implicitly acknowledges the existence of multiple additional NDAs because he says that “[c]ounsel for certain of these individuals” have insisted that Black not provide information about “their clients” or the NDAs they signed. Complaint ¶ 33. However, at his voluntary interview Black declined to answer when staff asked “[h]ow many NDAs are you a party to?” Complaint ¶ 31. So we can assume the answer to that question is at least five, and maybe a lot more than that.
In Black’s view, the fact that he, billionaire benefactor and close personal friend of Jeffrey Epstein, entered into NDAs with multiple women has nothing to do with Epstein and therefore has no bearing on COGR’s investigation. This might be less than obvious to the committee in light of evidence such as that spelled out in Senator Ron Wyden’s March 20, 2026 letter to Black, which included the following passage:
[R]ecords unsealed by the DOJ indicate that Epstein may have served as a “fixer” regarding women who were paid tens of millions of dollars in exchange for their silence. Unsealed records indicate that you may have funneled hush money payments to women using Epstein as a middleman, raising concerns of potential money laundering. Epstein also provided the location of women on your payroll to a well-connected Russian government operative and asked for “suggestions” on how to deal with them.
This sounds to me like something COGR could reasonably inquire about and not, as Black argues, simply private information with no possible bearing on its investigation.
Legal Analysis
For purposes of our discussion, however, it makes little difference whether we accept Black’s characterization of COGR’s subpoenas. That is because the court does not need to, and almost certainly will not, reach the issue whether COGR is entitled to ask Black about the NDAs or any other particular subject. Instead, Black’s lawsuit must fail because it is well-settled that courts lack power to restrain congressional committees from issuing or enforcing a subpoena, regardless of the recipient’s claim that the subpoena violates constitutional privilege, was improperly motivated, or is otherwise unlawful.
As Stan Brand, then the general counsel to the clerk of the House, explained in a memorandum to Chairman John Dingell, then the chair of the Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations of the House Committee on Energy & Commerce, “[i]t is settled beyond peradventure of doubt that the courts will not interfere in the legislative process by way of enjoining implementation of a subpoena or declaring that it is an illegal or unconstitutional exercise of legislative authority.” Memorandum of March 21, 1983, reproduced in Lance Cole & Stanley M. Brand, Congressional Investigations and Oversight 195 (2011).
The leading authority on this issue is Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975), which involved a congressional subpoena seeking the bank records of an organization focused on communicating its anti-war message to American servicemen at home and abroad. The committee issuing the subpoena sought to determine the sources of funding for the organization, particularly whether any of that funding was from foreign sources. The organization, which sued the chairman, senators and staff of the committee, alleged that the subpoena was designed to harass, chill and deter the organization and its members in the exercise of their free speech rights and therefore violated the First Amendment.
Accepting these allegations as true, the Court held the action nonetheless must be dismissed because the congressional defendants were immune from judicial relief under the Speech or Debate Clause. That clause protects activities within the “legitimate legislative sphere,” which the Court has defined as activities that are “’and integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House.’” Eastland, 421 U.S. at 503-04 (quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972)). The “power to investigate and to do so through compulsory process,” the Court held, “plainly falls within that definition.” Eastland, 421 U.S. at 504.
The Eastland decision has generally been understood, as Brand’s memo indicates, as an absolute bar against any attempt by the recipient of a congressional subpoena to receive injunctive or declaratory relief against a committee (or its members/staff) that issued it. Furthermore, as Brand also notes, even apart from and prior to Eastland, “the law of this circuit clearly established that a witness could not obtain injunctive or declaratory relief against a congressional subpoena, and attempts to do so have been universally rejected on several grounds.” See, e.g., Pauling v. Eastland, 288 F.2d 126, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (“as a matter of basic general principle a court cannot interfere with or impede the processes of the Congress by proscribing anticipatorily its inquiries”). In the 43 years (gulp) since Brand’s memo, witnesses have on occasion attempted to find loopholes in this rule, but none have succeeded. (In one case a court even dismissed such a lawsuit on Speech or Debate grounds where the congressional defendants expressly declined to rely on that doctrine.)
The most recent attempt was rather harshly rejected by the D.C. Circuit just a few weeks before Black filed his lawsuit. See De la Torre v. Cassidy, No. 25-5353 (D.C. Cir. July 31, 2026). That case involved a health care CEO, Dr. de la Torre, who was subpoenaed to testify before a Senate committee investigating the bankruptcy of his healthcare company, a matter clearly within its jurisdiction. He failed to appear because, according to his counsel, he feared the committee would turn the hearing into a “pseudo-criminal proceeding.” Dr. de la Torre’s counsel subsequently invoked his client’s Fifth Amendment right not to testify and, when the committee and the full Senate nonetheless adopted a contempt resolution, de la Torre brought suit against the members of the committee, claiming that the subpoena was “ultra vires” due to the lack of a valid legislative purpose. In essence, he claimed that because he informed the committee he would invoke his privilege against self-incrimination, there was no information it could obtain and no legitimate reason for proceeding with the hearing. The committee’s only reason for demanding that he appear and invoke the privilege in person, de la Torre alleged, was to humiliate him in public.
De la Torre’s lawsuit, the D.C. Circuit held, was indistinguishable from Eastland. Just as in Eastland, de la Torre claimed that the committee was violating his constitutional rights and acting for improper reasons, rather than legitimately attempting to gather information for legislative purposes. But even if de la Torre refused to answer any questions based on his Fifth Amendment privilege, that would not make the committee’s demand that he appear to testify illegitimate. See De la Torre, slip op. at 13 (“Article I constitutionally empowers the Senators to investigate and to call witnesses pertinent to their legislative work, to ask them questions, and to hear whatever answers they provide, whether facts, opinions, or invocations of the Fifth Amendment.”).
Thus, “[c]ontrary to Dr. de la Torre’s ill-conceived assumption, the legitimacy of Congress’s investigative work and legislative work does not change just because a witness eschews answering questions on Fifth Amendment grounds.” Id. As the Court stated in Eastland, “[t]he wisdom of congressional approach or methodology is not open to judicial veto.” 421 U.S. at 509. Further, a “valid legislative inquiry” requires “no predictable end result” because “[t]he very nature of the investigative function—like any research—is that it takes the searchers up some ‘blind alleys’ and into nonproductive enterprises.” Id.; see also De la Torre, slip op. at 13.
The D.C. Circuit was unsparing in its evaluation of de la Torre’s arguments, calling them “wholly meritless under longstanding precedent,” “completely wrong,” and “not even colorable.” De la Torre, slip op. at 2, 8, 13.
Black’s position is equally foreclosed by Eastland and, if anything, is even weaker than Dr. de la Torre’s. Like de la Torre, Black is attempting to conflate his objection to a particular investigative step taken by the committee with an attack on the validity of the investigation itself. Just as de la Torre could not dispute that the underlying investigation by the Senate committee was within its jurisdiction, Black cannot (and apparently does not) dispute COGR’s jurisdiction to conduct the underlying investigation of the Epstein matter described earlier. Furthermore, while Black may not be as central a witness as de la Torre, it cannot be seriously disputed (and he does not appear to dispute) that Black’s relationship with Epstein makes him a significant witness from whom COGR has a clear and legitimate legislative interest in hearing.
Black’s only objection is that some of the questions COGR may seek to ask him (namely those relating to NDAs in which Epstein was allegedly not involved) are not pertinent to the investigation and therefore lack a legitimate legislative purpose. But there are clearly pertinent questions, such as why Black paid Epstein exorbitant sums of money after Epstein became a registered sex offender, which Black could be asked in a deposition. The fact that Black claims that he has already voluntarily answered the most important questions, such as whether he had any knowledge of Epstein’s sex trafficking activities, is irrelevant. COGR is entitled to question Black under oath in a formal deposition even if Black had answered every pertinent question in a voluntary interview. Moreover, unlike de la Torre, who at least could argue that a hearing would produce no additional information that was useful for legislative purposes (since he intended to assert the privilege against self-incrimination as to all questions), Black cannot plausibly deny that questioning in a deposition might produce information that would be useful for COGR’s investigation. Thus, like de la Torre, Black lacks a colorable argument for refusing to appear in response to the committee’s testimonial subpoena, much less a basis for avoiding the Speech or Debate immunity the congressional defendants enjoy under Eastland.
Black’s objection to COGR’s document subpoena fares little better. It sought three categories of documents: (1) all NDAs to which Black was a party; (2) all NDAs to which Epstein or Maxwell was a party; and (3) all NDAs in which Epstein or Maxwell was referenced or was involved in preparation. Complaint ¶ 35. Black does not seem to dispute that the second and third categories seek documents relevant to the committee’s investigation. He merely contends that he has no responsive documents. Complaint ¶¶ 45-46.
Black does object to the first category of documents on the ground that it was “extraordinarily broad.” Complaint ¶ 45. He argues that it could be read to encompass “routine commercial agreements” and “settlement agreements” with no possible connection to the Epstein investigation. Complaint ¶ 45. Probably more to the point, he contends that “Epstein was not his ‘NDA adviser,’ was not involved in writing any confidentiality agreements for Mr. Black, was not involved in awarding funds to anyone related to Mr. Black, and was not otherwise involved in preparing or negotiating any confidentiality agreements for Mr. Black.” Complaint ¶ 46.
Black’s objection is indistinguishable from objections that routinely arise regarding both congressional and judicial document subpoenas. Such subpoenas are invariably written in a broad fashion to ensure that all relevant documents are covered. This case shows why. Black acknowledges that Epstein did play a role with regard to one of the women with whom Black entered into an NDA. See Complaint ¶ 44 (noting that “Epstein played a consulting role in discussions with Mr. Black and his counsel concerning the demands made by Ms. Ganieva”). But because Epstein was not a party to, referenced by or involved in drafting the NDA Black maintains (reasonably enough) that this NDA was not covered by either the second or third category of the committee subpoena. It is only because of the first catchall category that this NDA was covered by the subpoena. Black, who grudgingly produced this document to COGR, does not seriously dispute that it is relevant to the investigation.
As to the other NDAs, Black maintains that they are not relevant to the investigation. But even accepting the proposition that COGR is obligated to take Black’s word on this, it is noteworthy that Black stops short of saying that Epstein had absolutely no involvement with either the NDAs or the claims which gave rise to them. For example, Black does not foreclose the possibility that Epstein introduced him to any of the women in question or otherwise was involved in Black’s relationship with these women.
None of that matters, however. Even if Black is right that the document subpoena is overbroad in certain respects, that is a commonplace occurrence which does not invalidate the subpoena as a whole. Black’s reliance on language in De la Torre, which states that “Eastland allows plaintiffs to attempt to quash a congressional subpoena if it lacks any legitimate legislative purpose from the outset,” see De la Torre, slip op. at 16, is misplaced. See Complaint ¶ 76. The Eastland Court is referring to the situation where a congressional investigation is invalid because the inquiry itself is clearly outside the committee’s jurisdiction, noting that “’[t]he courts should not go beyond the narrow confines of determining that a committee’s inquiry may fairly be deemed within its province.’” Eastland, 421 U.S. at 506 (quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.367, 378 (1951)). Here there is no serious dispute that the Epstein investigation is within COGR’s province; the only dispute is about the propriety of a particular investigative step within that legitimate investigation. And even if the court could review the propriety of particular investigative steps, Black’s objection to the breadth of the document subpoena is not an objection to the legislative purpose of the subpoena itself.
In short, Black’s attempts to “extricate himself from settled precedent,” like those of Dr. de la Torre, are “futile.” See De la Torre, slip op. at 14. They will meet the same fate.
Black’s Novel Claim
Perhaps recognizing that his principal objections to the COGR subpoenas lack a colorable basis for avoiding the congressional defendants’ Speech or Debate immunity, Black advances an additional claim relating not to the validity of the subpoenas but to the method of enforcing those subpoenas. Specifically, Black claims that COGR has somehow violated his rights by threatening to bring a civil action to enforce its subpoenas. Complaint ¶¶ 82-94.
Admittedly no court has likely had occasion to rule on whether this claim is barred by the Speech or Debate Clause, but that’s only because no one has ever previously thought to bring such an absurd claim.
To be clear, whether a House committee in fact has the requisite statutory authority to civilly enforce its subpoenas is an open question in the D.C. Circuit, as I have discussed previously. If COGR had in fact sued Black to enforce its subpoenas, he would have a reasonable argument (though not one guaranteed to prevail) for dismissal of the lawsuit on that basis. But COGR has not sued Black. Black does not even allege that COGR has voted to authorize a civil lawsuit. If it had done so, that vote would have been clearly protected by the Speech or Debate Clause (and in any event would not have given rise to a justiciable controversy over COGR’s authority to sue).
If COGR could be sued for “threatening” (we will come back to that word in a second) to enforce its subpoena civilly, it could also be sued for “threatening” to issue the subpoena in the first place. The latter action would be a transparently impermissible method of attempting to avoid COGR’s Speech or Debate immunity. It is mystifying why anyone would think that the former is more permissible than the latter.
I would also note that if Black is correct that COGR lacks a statutory cause of action to enforce a subpoena, the same reasoning would suggest that a subpoena recipient lacks a statutory cause of action to sue a committee for issuing, threatening to issue, or threatening to enforce a subpoena. Otherwise, as I pointed out in my prior post, we would have an anomalous situation where a committee cannot bring an action to enforce a subpoena, whereas a witness could bring an action to attack it. That, however, is a small problem in comparison with the basic point that wrongful “threatening” of a civil action is not by itself judicially redressable.
In addition to this fundamental legal problem, Black has an equally serious factual problem. At no point does he plead that COGR, or anyone associated with COGR, actually threatened to bring a civil action against him. Instead, he apparently infers such a threat from a letter in which Chairman Comer stated that if Black failed to produce additional documents responsive to the document subpoena, COGR would use “all tools at its disposal, including contempt.” Complaint ¶¶ 49, 83.
How is this a threat to bring a civil action? The words quoted do not say, one way or the other, whether a civil action is one of the tools COGR may use (or consider using). What Black is alleging is not a “threat” at all, but a failure to expressly abjure the possibility that the committee would bring a civil action. But making that allegation would sound silly (because it is silly) so Black has invented a threat that never occurred.
Conclusion
All of this raises the question of why this lawsuit, which clearly has no chance of success, was filed in the first place. We can rule out bad lawyering—as you might guess, Black has top flight legal talent representing him (including four lawyers from Hogan Lovells).
The most likely answer is that Black and/or his lawyers believe that he gains an advantage from filing the lawsuit, even if it never prevails. That conclusion is reinforced by considering the case of Dr. de la Torre. Although the Senate by unanimous consent referred de la Torre’s contempt to the U.S. attorney on September 25, 2024, the Department of Justice has taken no action to bring the matter before the grand jury in the intervening two years. Although DOJ has never to my knowledge given a reason for this failure, it was thought by many that the pendency of de la Torre’s lawsuit was its excuse for not acting.
It should be noted that following the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in de la Torre, Chairman Cassidy and Ranking Member Sanders of the Senate HELP Committee (which is the committee that subpoenaed de la Torre) wrote to the then acting attorney general to demand action and an update on the contempt case against de la Torre. (To my knowledge, DOJ has not responded).
Since Black filed his lawsuit, COGR adopted a contempt resolution against him and the House by unanimous consent agreed to refer the contempt to the U.S. attorney for the District of Columbia. The U.S. attorney’s office responded to the Black contempt vote with the statement that “The US Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia will review the referral of Mr. Black carefully and will not hesitate to pursue additional cases where the evidence supports.” This is less than a promise to present the case to a grand jury, as required by 2 U.S.C. § 194, but more than it has said with respect to Dr. de la Torre.
I suspect that Black and his lawyers believe that DOJ will not move forward with criminal proceedings while his lawsuit against COGR is pending, i.e., it will treat him the same way as it did Dr. de la Torre. An interesting question is whether this belief is based just on the public record, or whether they have received some assurances, either from the U.S. attorney’s office or main Justice, to that effect. A question that COGR may want to ask DOJ.