Category: Congressional Investigations

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Could Congress Subpoena Snowden?

So let’s say a congressional committee wanted to take evidence from fugitive extraordinaire Edward Snowden. What options would it have?

First, the committee could issue a subpoena to Snowden, just as it would any witness. Although I don’t know of any case directly on point, it seems to me that a congressional subpoena to a U.S. citizen would be effective regardless of where the citizen is located. See generally Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932)  (“Nor can it be doubted that the United States possesses the power inherent in sovereignty to require the return to this country of a citizen, resident elsewhere, whenever the public interest requires it, and to penalize him in case of refusal.”). If Snowden were properly served with a subpoena to testify at a congressional hearing, he could be held in contempt if he failed to appear.

Legally, I don’t think the committee would need any special authority to subpoena Snowden in a foreign jurisdiction as long as it could figure out a way to serve him with the subpoena. Although personal service is the traditional method of serving congressional subpoenas, one might argue that electronic service is adequate under these extraordinary circumstances. But even if service can be accomplished, the committee would still have the practical problem that Snowden could not be punished for contempt until he returns to the United States.

This brings us to another option. As discussed in this CRS memo from 1997, congressional committees have from time to time been authorized to take depositions abroad and seek other means of international assistance in gathering information abroad. The memo, which was written as the House was considering a resolution authorizing extraterritorial investigative activity in connection with the investigation of campaign finance irregularities, explains:

The Committee and its staff are not going to be able to barge into Jakarta or Beijing, set up shop and start subpoenaing foreign nationals or foreign government officials to testify under oath. Rather, the Committee will be given the opportunity to use the various international channels of access to foreign-held information. In the end, the degree of legal formality and difficulty encountered by the Committee if it seeks to hold hearings in a foreign country or to have depositions taken or written interrogation answered, will depend on the nature and sensitivity of the inquiry sought to be conducted which, in turn, will often determine the extent of international comity that will be accorded.

One procedure for obtaining international assistance in obtaining information is the use of letters rogatory, which ask a foreign court to use its own compulsory process to obtain testimony or documents from a witness. At least one congressional committee, the House Select Committee on Assassinations in the 1970s, successfully used letters rogatory to obtain evidence overseas. Other committees, such as the Iran-Contra select committee, have been authorized to use them but did not actually do so. See George W. Van Cleve & Charles Tiefer, International Enterprises in Major Congressional Investigations: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 55 Mo. L. Rev. 43, 92 (1990).

Other methods of obtaining foreign assistance rely on treaty obligations to facilitate the service of process or the taking of evidence. A congressional committee can also seek a foreign government’s assistance as a matter of comity. The CRS memo describes how the October Surprise Task Force was able to obtain the cooperation of a number of foreign governments in obtaining documents and testimony relevant to its investigation, although, shockingly, “[t]he Government of Iran, contacted on numerous occasions through its Permanent Mission to the United Nations, denied the Task Force’s request to travel to Iran to conduct interviews.” The House Ethics Committee also found it difficult to obtain evidence during its “Korea-gate” investigation:

Key to the investigation was the role played by one witness, Kim Dong Jo, a former ROK official, who was not subject to compulsory committee process. In addition to the ROK’s reluctance to make the witness available, the Committee encountered difficulties with our Justice Department and the State Department, through which formal communications and negotiations with the ROK Government had to be channelled. Over a period of a year, the Committee, with the assistance of the House leadership, engaged in public education, Congressional pressure, negotiation, and finally Congressional reprisal.

As these examples illustrate, the key variable in these efforts in the cooperation of the foreign government. In the case of Russia, this is going to be a problem. The State Department website reports:

In July 2003, Russia unilaterally suspended all judicial cooperation with the United States in civil and commercial matters. The Russian Federation refuses to serve letters of request from the United States for service of process presented under the terms of the 1965 Hague Service Convention or to execute letters rogatory requesting service of process transmitted via diplomatic channels. The Russian Federation also declines to give consideration to U.S. requests to obtain evidence. While the Department of State is prepared to transmit letters rogatory for service or evidence to Russian authorities via diplomatic channels, in the Department’s experience, all such requests are returned unexecuted. Likewise requests sent directly by litigants to the Russian Central Authority under the Hague Service Convention are returned unexecuted.

This certainly raises questions whether a congressional committee could obtain Russian assistance to question Snowden. But it is at least conceivable that Russia, and its erratic president, would see advantage in cooperating with a congressional investigation into Snowden’s activities. They might prefer a congressional deposition of Snowden to permitting the executive branch to interview him.

In any event, you can’t know unless you ask.

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Privileged Communications in Congressional Investigations

Michael Bopp and DeLisa Lay of Gibson Dunn have recently published an article, “The Availability of Common Law Privilege for Witnesses in Congressional Investigations” in the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy. It provides a helpful overview of congressional authority and practice with regard to assertions of attorney-client and other common law privileges in congressional investigations.

The article also focuses on a more unusual topic: the extent to which communications by lawyers and others involved in representing private parties in congressional investigations or other proceedings will themselves be protected by privilege. In other words, if a company hires lawyers, lobbyists or media consultants to represent it in connection with a congressional investigation, will it be able to claim privilege over its communications with these professionals, if for example they should be sought by adversaries in a future civil or criminal proceeding?

Not surprisingly, the answer turns out to be complicated. But it got me to wondering whether congressional committees could bolster future claims of privilege by, for example, allowing attorneys for congressional witnesses to “enter an appearance” in an investigation. In exchange for counsel adhering to certain ground rules established by the committee (eg, counsel could be required to acknowledge that the committee is a “tribunal” within the meaning of the legal ethics rules), it could recognize the privileged nature of the representation, which might (or might not) have an influence on courts or other tribunals considering future claims of privilege.

Does anyone know of committees doing this or something similar?

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That Didn’t Take Long

Even before the Speaker had certified the contempt, this letter arrived from Deputy Attorney General James Cole informing him that “the Department has determined that the Attorney General’s response to the subpoena issued by the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform does not constitute a crime, and therefore the Department will not bring the congressional contempt citation before a grand jury or take any other action to prosecute the Attorney General.”

It should be noted that the statute, 2 U.S.C. § 194, assigns a duty to the United States Attorney, not to the “Department.” It is interesting that the letter comes from the Deputy Attorney General, not from the United States Attorney for District of Columbia, who is the official charged with the responsibility for presenting the congressional contempt case to the grand jury.

Presumably the Department would point to the fact that Attorney General Mukasey sent a similar letter in the case of the congressional contempt certifications for Josh Bolten and Harriet Miers. But the fact that something was done before doesn’t make it right, and I cannot understand why the Attorney General (or the Deputy Attorney General), rather than the U.S. Attorney, would be responsible for making the decision that the statute clearly assigns to the latter.

Presumably, in this case the letter did not come from Attorney General Holder because it would look like a conflict of interest for Holder to declare that he would not prosecute himself. But this doesn’t look much better.

 

Update: here is Senator Grassley’s letter to U.S. Attorney Machen questioning whether he has made an independent determination regarding the scope of the executive privilege claim and whether the case should be submitted to the grand jury.

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The Holder Contempt- Civil Enforcement Edition

The House is scheduled to vote today on holding the Attorney General in contempt for his failure to comply with congressional subpoenas seeking documents in the Fast and Furious investigation. Since my last post on this subject, the House leadership has decided in addition to voting on the resolution to certify the contempt to the U.S. Attorney, the House will vote on H. Res. 706, which would authorize the Chairman of the Committee on Oversight and Governmental Reform to initiate judicial proceedings “to seek declaratory judgments affirming the duty of Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, to comply with any subpoena [covered by the contempt resolution].”

H.Res. 706 provides COGR an alternative mechanism to attempt to enforce the subpoena. Assuming that the U.S Attorney refuses to present the contempt certification to the grand jury, COGR can file suit in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment that Holder is required to produce some or all of the documents covered by the subpoenas.

Indeed, the U.S. Attorney may look on the availability of the civil enforcement mechanism as a ground for refusing to present the matter to a grand jury, at least until there is a resolution of the civil enforcement case. He may contend that a civil suit is the most appropriate means for resolving disputes between the executive and legislative branches regarding the applicability of executive privilege. This would be consistent with the position taken by the Department of Justice during the Reagan Administration.

However, during the Bush 43 Administration, the Department took a different position. It not only flatly refused to present a congressional contempt case against White House officials to the grand jury, but it also raised numerous jurisdictional objections to the House’s attempt to have the privilege issues resolved in a civil declaratory judgment action. Instead, the Department suggested that the only way the House could enforce a subpoena against an executive branch official would be to send the Sergeant-at-Arms to arrest him or her. Fortunately, Judge Bates did not find this to be a compelling argument.

So the question is- which Department of Justice will show up this time? Will it acknowledge the jurisdiction of the federal courts to resolve a declaratory judgment action regarding executive privilege? If so, a civil enforcement suit may be a relatively attractive and expeditious way of settling the dispute here. But if the Department intends to raise standing, subject-matter jurisdiction and political question issues (and the like), the House may be better off demanding that the U.S. Attorney comply with his statutory duty to present the matter to the grand jury.

Of course, if all else fails, there is always the nuclear option of sending the Sergeant-at-Arms to arrest the Attorney General. Professor Chafetz notwithstanding, however, I think this should be a really last resort.

David Laufman has more here.

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The Holder Contempt- A Procedural Primer

As you may have heard, President Obama has asserted executive privilege with regard to Department of Justice documents sought by the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform as part of its investigation of the “Fast and Furious” program, and COGR has voted to hold Attorney General Holder in contempt for failing to produce them. Rather than delving into the merits (on that subject see commentary by Todd Gaziano at Heritage’s The Foundry, John Hinderaker at PowerLine and Andrew Rudalevige at the Monkey Cage), I will lay out the procedural posture of the case in this post.

The Statutory Contempt Process

There are several ways that Congress can attempt to compel the production of information, but it appears that the House will follow the ordinary procedure, which may be referred to as criminal or statutory contempt, Understanding this process begins with a federal statute, 2 U.S.C. § 192, that states “[e]very person who having been summoned . . .  to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before . . . any committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes default . . . shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .”

This provision in turn must be read in conjunction with another section, 2 U.S.C. § 194, which provides:

Whenever a witness summoned as mentioned in section 192 of this title fails . . . to produce any books, papers, records, or documents, as required . . . and the fact of such failure or failures is reported to either House while Congress is in session or when Congress is not in session, a statement of fact constituting such failure is reported to and filed with the President of the Senate or Speaker of the House, it shall be the duty of the said President of the Senate or Speaker of the House, as the case may be, to certify, and he shall so certify, the statement of facts aforesaid under the seal of the Senate or House, as the case may be, to the appropriate United States attorney, whose duty it shall be to bring the matter before the grand jury for its action.

A person relying on a literal reading of these provisions could be led seriously astray. In the first place, although nothing in the language of these sections indicates that certification by the presiding officer is a necessary prerequisite to prosecution under section 192, legislative, judicial and executive precedent clearly establishes that this is the case.

In the second place, although section 194 literally seems to require certification whenever “the fact of such failure or failures” is reported to the House or Senate, this is not the case. Before certification takes place, the House or Senate, as the case may be, must vote to hold the witness in contempt. Only then does it become the “duty” of the presiding officer to certify the contempt.

Even more perplexingly, if the House (for example) is not in session, and the “statement of fact” is presented to the Speaker, it is not the automatic duty of the Speaker to certify the contempt, although this is what section 194 seems to say. Instead, the D.C. Circuit held in Wilson v. United States, 369 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1966), that the Speaker cannot automatically certify the contempt, but must exercise some sort of discretionary review akin to that which the House would exercise if it were in session.

Finally, although the statute seems clear that the United States attorney to whom a certification is made must bring it before the grand jury for its action, this is also controversial. The executive branch has maintained that the statute cannot be interpreted to interfere with its prosecutorial discretion or with its authority to assert executive privilege. Specifically, in the one case in history where the House voted, and the Speaker certified, contempt against an executive branch official who withheld documents from a congressional committee on grounds of executive privilege, the Office of Legal Counsel opined that the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia was not required to refer the matter to the grand jury (or to initiate a prosecution). See 8 O.L.C. 101 (May 30, 1984). Although OLC’s reasoning would seem to apply to any case where an executive official asserted executive privilege at the President’s direction, it declined to announce a general rule, limiting its opinion to the specific facts of that case.

Continue reading “The Holder Contempt- A Procedural Primer”

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“We Refer a Lot of Things that Don’t Get Prosecuted”

So noted former congressman Tom Davis after Roger Clemens was acquitted on all charges stemming from his congressional testimony regarding alleged steroid use. Davis was explaining to the Washington Post why he did not believe the Justice Department was obligated to prosecute Clemens even though he and Representative Henry Waxman (respectively the ranking member and chairman of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform at the time Clemens testified before that committee) had referred the matter to the Department for investigation.

As a technical matter, Davis is certainly correct. The Justice Department is not obligated to, and does not in fact, prosecute all cases referred to it by Congress. (Arguably, the Justice Department is obligated to present all congressional contempt cases referred under 2 U.S.C. ¶ 194 to a grand jury, but it doesn’t do that either).

In the case of a congressional perjury referral such as was made with regard to Clemens, I think it is safe to assume that the Justice Department conducted a thorough investigation of whether Clemens lied before Congress when he denied ever having used steroids. After conducting the investigation, it presumably reached an independent conclusion that Clemens was lying. It seems unlikely that the Department relied on the referral letter from Waxman and Davis, particularly since that letter states: “We are not in a position to reach a definitive judgment as to whether Mr. Clemens lied to the Committee. Our only conclusion is that significant questions have been raised about Mr. Clemens’s truthfulness and that further investigation by the Department of Justice is warranted.”

It is different matter with respect to the “congressional elements” of the charges, however. Although the referral letter does not explicitly address these questions, the Justice Department would have reasonably assumed from the fact of the referral itself that Waxman and Davis believed that Clemens’s testimony was “material” to a matter within the jurisdiction of the committee, and, of course, that the committee was a “competent tribunal” engaged in the “due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry.”

Continue reading ““We Refer a Lot of Things that Don’t Get Prosecuted””

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Why Doesn’t Congress Investigate National Security Leaks by the Executive Branch?

Stop laughing, I’m serious. If Senator Feinstein and Representative Rogers, the chairs of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees respectively, want to get to the bottom of recent leaks of highly classified information from the executive branch, why don’t they conduct the investigation themselves?

Hear me out. The knee-jerk reaction to such issues is to call for the appointment of a special prosecutor, someone appointed by the Attorney General but given a guarantee of independence to conduct his or her investigation. However, even if the independence of the prosecutor is generally accepted (something that cannot be taken for granted in the highly partisan times in which we live), the criminal process is not necessarily the best mechanism for investigating the leaking of classified information.

For one thing, a prosecutor’s job is to build criminal cases, not to find out how and why leaks have occurred and how to stop them from happening again. For another, there are a lot of difficulties in conducting a successful criminal leak investigation. As recently explained by the Assistant Attorney General for the National Security Division: “One inherent difficulty in leak cases is that the investigations are focused on the pool of individuals who had access to the information, and not those to whom the information was disclosed. This is reflective of the fact that while there are certainly significant national security and law enforcement equities at play in unauthorized disclosure cases, there is also a need to recognize the serious First Amendment interests implicated whenever the media becomes involved in a criminal investigation.” Moreover, when the information in question has been widely disseminated across government agencies, it “can make identifying the source of the leak essentially impossible.”

The congressional intelligence committees have all the tools needed to investigate this matter. They have authority to compel the production of documents, testimony and other evidence in executive session and the systems and procedures to protect the secrecy of the information they gather. They have greater flexibility with regard to obtaining information from the media. Unlike a prosecutor, they don’t have to worry about fixing blame on a particular individual, satisfying all the elements of a criminal violation, or meeting the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. They also do not need to conduct a public trial that might itself jeopardize national security. In addition to assessing responsibility for prior leaks, they can focus on actions to prevent future leaks and to contain the damage that has already been done.

The obvious rejoinder to all of this is that no one would trust Congress to conduct a fair and impartial investigation of such a politically sensitive matter. But while that observation might be compelling in other circumstances, this is a special case. In the first place, the secretive nature of the intelligence committees’ work makes them less susceptible to the occupational hazard of grandstanding. In the second place, Feinstein and Rogers are widely respected, and it would be hard (not impossible, but hard) to characterize any investigation that they jointly conducted as either a witch hunt or a coverup.

And in this case, the comparison is not to a special prosecutor but to prosecutors handpicked by Attorney General Holder. As far as public confidence is concerned, Feinstein and Rogers (or should it be Rogers and Feinstein- it has more of a ring) win hands down.

Of course, if the congressional intelligence committees were to undertake this investigation, they would need an experienced investigator to lead it. Someone who the public would trust. Preferably with some experience in leak investigations. I wonder if anyone like that is available?

 

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Is Congress Competent?

Ok, that’s not exactly the question raised by attorneys for Roger Clemens in last week’s filing in federal district court, but I bet its how they hope the jurors interpret the question.

Technically, the issue that Rusty Hardin and company want jurors to consider is whether the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (COGR) was a “competent tribunal” when it questioned Clemens in 2008 about his alleged steroid use. They also want jurors to decide if COGR was engaged in “the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry” and whether Clemens’s alleged false statements were made in a matter “within the jurisdiction” of the legislative branch.

According to the defense team, these competency elements all boil down to one basic inquiry: what was COGR’s purpose in calling Clemens to testify and with respect to the specific questions he was asked. Examples of improper purpose, they say, include:

  • Questioning a witness solely for a purpose other than to elicit facts in aid of legislation
  • Usurping the functions of a prosecuting attorney in the guise of a legislative investigation
  • Re-questioning a witness for the purpose of rendering him more liable to criminal prosecution
  • Conducting a hearing for an actual purpose different than a stated purpose
  • Directing an inquiry primarily to the witness’s guilt or innocence of a crime

To which the prosecution responds: go ahead, make my day. Rather than contesting the defense position on what types of competency issues may be presented to the jury, or pointing out the serious Speech or Debate/separation of powers problems that could result from a judicial inquiry into legislative motives, the government seems to concede the defense’s right to put COGR on trial.

Instead, the prosecution warns that if the defense exercises this right, the government must be permitted the opportunity to show the “broader context” of the congressional investigation. It says “if defendant thus calls into question the competency of the congressional tribunal by suggesting that the Committee was not acting with a proper legislative purpose, then the United States must be permitted to explain, among other things, the seriousness of the problem of steroids and other performance enhancing drugs, the national spotlight being cast on this problem, and the necessity for the congressional inquiry.” The defendant “cannot, on the one hand, impugn the integrity of the Oversight Committee by suggesting that its true- singular- motive was a perjury indictment of him, but, on the other hand, preclude the United States from explaining to the jury, for example, that the Committee’s investigative work was of national importance because of the wide-spread problem of steroid and other performance enhancing drug use in Major League Baseball.”

This strikes me as a dubious prosecution strategy. In the first place, I doubt that anyone is disputing the “seriousness of the problem of steroids and other performance enhancing drugs,” generally speaking. What is being questioned is the reason for calling a particular witness to a particular congressional hearing. I don’t think that Judge Walton will allow that to be the basis for inquiry into steroid use by other baseball players. Moreover, even if the court does allow it, I am not sure this is a good trade for the prosecution. Many jurors may be more concerned about Congress’s reasons for the investigation than they are about steroid use in baseball.

I also wonder about the more general implications of the prosecution’s apparent concessions. The government must prove that Clemens’s statements were material, and this means that they have to be related to a legitimate legislative purpose. But there also have to be limits on how far the parties can go into the actual motives of the COGR members, or otherwise every congressional perjury case will devolve into a political trial of Members of Congress. The prosecutors have not suggested, at least yet, what those limits might be.

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The Solyndra Subpoenas and the White House Response

The House Energy and Commerce Committee has issued subpoenas to the White House Chief of Staff and the Chief of Staff to the Vice President, seeking documents relating to the Solyndra loan scandal. Specifically, each subpoena asks for “[a]ll documents referring or relating in any way to the $535 million loan guarantee issued to Solyndra, Inc. by the Department of Energy.” This is the only request made by the subpoenas. Although they provide a non-exclusive list of examples that would be responsive to the request, they ask for no other documents.

In this letter, the White House Counsel Kathryn Ruemmler responds that the subpoenas are “unprecedented.” Unprecedented in what sense? Obviously, congressional committees have issued numerous subpoenas to prior administrations, including subpoenas seeking documents and testimony from White House officials. Such subpoenas were rare before Watergate (and virtually unheard of before World War II), but they have become rather commonplace since. Here are some examples of congressional subpoenas issued to the Bush Administration. During the Clinton Administration, House Government Reform Committee Chairman Dan Burton became something of a legend for the number of subpoenas he issued (reportedly over a thousand), including many to the White House.

Perhaps there is something about these particular subpoenas that makes them, in Ruemmler’s view, “unprecedented.” But nowhere in her letter does she explain what that might be.

Instead, her primary objection seems to be that the subpoenas are “overbroad.” She characterizes the document request as “extremely broad” because it “encompasses all communications within the White House from the beginning of this Administration to the present that refer or relate to Solyndra,” and she suggests that “any document that references Solyndra, even in passing, is arguably responsive to the Committee’s request.” She contends that responding to such an “expansive request” would place “an unreasonable burden on the President’s ability to meet his constitutional duties.” As an example, she cites the fact that the subpoenas would require producing “thousands of pages of news clips” literally responsive to the requests.

It is hard to characterize this objection as anything but silly. Asking the White House to produce all documents relating to a single small company is hardly placing an undue burden on the presidency. Federal agencies routinely respond to subpoenas and FOIA requests that are far broader in scope. All that needs to be done is to identify those locations most likely to contain responsive documents and to conduct a reasonable search thereof. Since most if not all of those locations will consist of electronic databases, a single search containing the word “Solyndra” would likely suffice.

Continue reading “The Solyndra Subpoenas and the White House Response”

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More Legal Misinformation About Congress

If there were an award for cramming the most amount of legal misinformation into the shortest segment, Friday’s edition of “Nightly Scoreboard” would surely earn a nomination. The subject was a potential congressional subpoena for White House emails concerning Solyndra, and the discussion took place between host David Asman and former federal prosecutor Annmarie McAvoy.

The premise of the piece was that a congressional subpoena for presidential emails would be “unprecedented” and would raise novel issues of executive privilege and separation of powers. McAvoy explained that “[t]here are certain communications that are not available to the Congress.” The following colloquy ensued:

 McAvoy: The argument will be made that the President has to be able to have full and free and open communications with those who are advising him, be those his senior staffers or be those other people in the industries that he is looking at who can come to him and openly talk to him and that he can communicate with them without having to worry about those communications going over to Congress.

 Asman: But have those statutes even been written- about emails- because this is new territory we’re in?

 McAvoy: It is and it raises a very interesting question because what happens is as we have new technologies essentially the law has to eventually catch up with the technology and it hasn’t as of yet. So they’ll be looking at your basic laws relating—and cases relating—to executive privilege in trying to figure out where this would fit in but there really isn’t a statute that directly applies to emails because it didn’t exist beforehand and none of the presidents before Obama had ever used email.

  Continue reading “More Legal Misinformation About Congress”