Category: Appointments and Removal

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Is the Presidency an Office “Under” the United States?

Applying Benjamin Cassady’s “electoral pardon” principle might suggest that the Disqualification Clause is inapplicable to the presidency (and vice-presidency). After all, if voters are allowed to disregard a candidate’s prior impeachment (or expulsion) and elect “their crook” to Congress, why shouldn’t the same hold true for a candidate for president? Professor Tillman maintains that the Disqualification Clause doesn’t apply to any elected offices, whether in Congress or the executive branch, thus consistently preserving the “electoral pardon” principle. Cassady, on the other hand, contends that the Framers did not take the principle that far:

[I]t should be noted that the Presidency was a uniquely American institution, substituting an elected and impeachable chief executive for an English monarch who was legally unreachable because he was presumed incapable of wrongdoing. As a result, the Wilkensian lessons of popular sovereignty and electoral pardon did not develop in the context of the executive branch, and it is sensible that the Framers would settle on a different default rule (impeachment and disqualification) for the elected President than the rule (expulsion and re-election) applied traditionally to the people’s legislators. Put another way, disqualifying an elected President for official wrongdoing couldn’t encroach on the people’s traditional right to pardon and re-elect a chief executive, because no such right existed in English history.

Cassady, 32 Quinnipiac L. Rev. at 276 n. 332.

Frankly, this explanation strikes me as rather circular. As indicated in my last post, however, I don’t find the “electoral pardon” principle all that persuasive in explaining the Disqualification Clause in the first place, and it seems to me that there is a stronger policy reason for disqualifying candidates for the presidency than for other offices, elected or appointed. But, as I am sure Professor Tillman would be quick to remind me, my policy intuitions are not constitutional law.

The precise question is whether the president holds an “Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States” as that phrase is used in the Disqualification Clause. Cassady’s article sheds some light on the origin of this language. He provides examples in English statutory law that referred to some variant of an “Office of honor, Trust or Profit,” where it almost always referred to offices conferred by the Crown. Id. at 278-80. As such, the offices were often identified as being “under” the Crown.

Early state constitutions also used terminology like “offices of honor, trust or profit” to refer generally to positions in the executive and judicial branches. See id. at 280-81 (“The overwhelming majority of examples from state constitutions distinguishes sharply between those who hold offices of honor, trust, or profit and members of the legislature”) & n. 355. Sometimes these offices were identified as being “under this state,” “under this commonwealth,” or “under the government.” See, e.g., Ga. Const. of 1777, art. XI (“No person bearing any post of profit under this State . . . shall be elected as a representative.”).

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House of Cads: Legislators and the Disqualification Clause

So I have now read Benjamin Cassady’s “You’ve Got Your Crook, I’ve Got Mine,” 32 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 209 (2014), to which Professor Tillman’s article responds. Cassady makes the case that the Constitution’s Impeachment and Disqualification Clauses do not apply to federal legislators. Much of the article is devoted to explaining why this result makes sense as a policy matter: basically that a crooked legislator is not as dangerous as a crooked judge or executive official and that voters should be able to “pardon” a crooked legislator by returning her to office with full knowledge of her misdeeds.

Cassady discusses at some length the famous case of John Wilkes, a radical and controversial member of Parliament who was expelled multiple times by the House of Commons for libelous comments but continually re-elected by his constituents. He argues that the fall-out from this case ultimately led to the recognition of an “electoral pardon” principle in the United States, pursuant to which it is improper for a legislator to be expelled (or not seated) based on conduct known to her constituents at the time they elect her.

I think Cassady is correct in his interpretation of the Impeachment and Disqualification Clauses. He may or may not be right that the “electoral pardon” principle explains why the Constitution treats legislators differently in this regard than executive or judicial officers. I am not sure myself that this distinction, particularly with regard to disqualification, makes that much sense from a policy standpoint. One might argue that there is no more reason to disqualify an impeached official from a future appointment to an executive or judicial office than from a future election to a congressional seat. After all, if the “voters” (who, in the case of senators, would originally have been the members of the state legislature) can “pardon” a candidate for a congressional seat, why shouldn’t the president and the Senate be permitted to “pardon” a nominee to an executive or judicial office?

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Tillman on the Disqualification Clause

Professor Seth Barrett Tillman has posted this draft article on the Disqualification Clause of Article I, § 3, cl. 7, which provides that “Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States.” Long story short, Professor Tillman argues that an “Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States” extends exclusively to statutory or appointed offices and excludes elected positions such as President, Vice-President, Senator and Representative. Thus, under his theory if a president, vice-president or a civil officer of the United States is impeached, removed from office and disqualified, that individual remains eligible to serve in any of the aforementioned elected positions. Tillman cites a number of pieces of evidence which he believes support this conclusion (some of which we have discussed in prior posts), and he argues that it is consistent with the “democracy canon” that, all other things being equal, the people should be entitled to vote for whomever they please to represent them.

This particular issue may be of limited practical importance, unless you are planning to work on the Porteous 2016 campaign, but it is of some interest with respect to the methodology of constitutional interpretation as well as other constitutional provisions that apply to “officers of” or “offices under” the United States. Related discussions may be found here (“May the President Accept a Foreign Title of Nobility?”), here (“Tillman’s Puzzles for Amar (or Who You Callin ‘Atextual’?)”) and here (“Six Answers for Six Puzzles”).

 

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Noel Canning: Unanimous Judgment, Divided Reasoning

For a 9-0 decision invalidating the President’s exercise of the recess appointment power, the Supreme Court’s opinion today in Noel Canning revealed a bitter divide among the justices. Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, basically went “full Daugherty,” finding that the Recess Appointment Clause applies to both “inter-session” and “intra-session” breaks, but finding that those breaks must exceed a minimum length to qualify as recesses in which the President may exercise his temporary appointment power. The key quote from Breyer’s decision:

If a Senate recess is so short that it does not require the consent of the House, it is too short to trigger the Recess Appointments Clause. See Art. I, §5, cl. 4. And a recess lasting less than 10 days is presumptively too short as well.

In his concurrence (joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas and Alito), Justice Scalia accuses the majority of adopting an “adverse possession” theory of executive power. In other words, because the executive has long asserted the power to fill vacancies that do not arise during a recess and has maintained that they may be filled during intra-session as well as inter-session breaks and because the Congress has failed to resist these theories on a consistent and effective basis, the executive branch’s theory will prevail. The concurrence would read the RAC to be limited to vacancies that arise during the recess and would hold that only a break between formal sessions constitutes “the recess.”

There will be undoubtedly many other takeaways from a thorough reading of the opinion. But note that this opinion has an important near term effect on the Congress. It appears at first blush that the House can prevent the President from making any more recess appointments simply by refusing to consent to any adjournments of more than three days for the remainder of the Congress.  But one can imagine that the executive branch and the Senate Democratic leadership might look for wriggle room, particularly if the Republicans win control of the Senate in November’s election. In particular, the Senate could try to amend its rules so as to deprive itself of the capacity for doing business during pro forma sessions. We will see whether they get that desperate.

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What Senate Legal Counsel’s Silence Says About Noel Canning: Not Much

Writing in Slate last week, Professor Neal Devins, a noted expert on the Constitution and Congress, had several complaints about how Congress presents its legal positions in court. Devins is unhappy that the House, because it operates on a majoritarian basis, may present legal views that are held only by the majority, but he is equally unhappy that the Senate, because it requires bipartisan consensus, may present no legal views at all. And he is particularly unhappy that in the Noel Canning recess appointments case the Supreme Court heard “only from the Senate minority and not from the Senate itself.” As Devins asks plaintively, “why would the Senate’s own lawyer sit on his hands while the minority leader purports to speak for the Senate?”

Why indeed. Let’s begin by reviewing how “the Senate’s own lawyer,” aka the Senate Legal Counsel, operates. As Devins notes, Senate Legal Counsel must, by statute, receive specific authorization before filing any brief on behalf of the Senate. Devins says that “counsel representation of the Senate requires two-thirds support of a leadership group made up of four members of the majority party and three members of the minority party,” but this is incorrect. Appearance as amicus curiae is authorized by Senate resolution, not by the Joint Leadership Group. See 2 U.S.C. § 288b(c). Nothing in the statute requires that such a resolution be bipartisan.

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Seth Barrett Tillman on the Relationship Between the Origination Clause and Recess Appointment Clause Cases

Professor Tillman sends the following thoughts:

I expect one or more, if not all of the Supreme Court’s four liberal members to affirm the DC Circuit’s decision in Noel Canning. The primary issue in Noel Canning is not whether or not the Senate was in recess – but who or what institution gets to decide whether or not the Senate was in recess. Does the Senate make that call or do the President and the courts? In other words, once the Senate has flagged in the traditional way in its traditional records whether or not it is in session or in recess, does anyone (including the President) get to look beyond or behind the record created by the Senate. The President’s position is that the President and the courts are in a better position to make the call than the Senate.

The Origination Clause challenge to the PPACA, which is now making its way through the lower courts, poses a very similar (if not precisely the same) issue. The enrolled bill enacting the PPACA expressly records that the bill originated in the House, not the Senate. The plaintiffs in the Origination Clause case take the position that the courts should ignore the joint determination of the House and Senate in regard to house of origin, in spite of the fact that the relevant constitutional actors have made a final determination using their traditional records in the traditional way. Here too, plaintiffs say the courts could and should look behind the official House-Senate-created-and-verified record.

When is the Senate in recess?

      When the Senate’s records state that the Senate was in recess.

When has a bill originated in the House?

      When the enrolled bill enacting the statute records that the bill originated in the House.

After all, with the demise of the filibuster, the scope of the President’s recess appointment power matters much less. So if the Supreme Court wants to reverse Noel Canning, then “Go ahead, make my day.”

 

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Heritage Foundation Panel on Recess Appointments

This Thursday, October 10, at noon, the Heritage Foundation will be hosting an event on recess appointments and the case currently pending in the Supreme Court. Senator Mike Lee will deliver opening remarks, followed by a panel discussion by Professor John Yoo and me. Here is the synopsis of the event:

Recess is over, but the President has been playing around with the Recess Appointments Clause. Earlier this year, President Obama’s alleged recess appointments to the National Labor Relations Board and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau came under fire. The problem? The Senate was not in recess at the time of the appointments. Three federal appellate courts have struck down various recess appointments as unconstitutional, and the Supreme Court has agreed to hear National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning this term.

In light of these controversial appointments, we are left with many questions. What is the role of the Senate when it comes to recess appointments? How did our Founding Fathers intend for the recess appointment power to be used? Can the Senate block the President from making recess appointments through the use of pro forma sessions? How might the justices rule in the Noel Canning case? Please join us as our panel of experts explores these issues.

The link for registering for this free event is here.

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Cert Granted on Three Recess Appointments Questions

The Supreme Court granted cert today in the Noel Canning case, as pretty much everyone expected. Cert was granted as to the two questions raised by the government, (1) whether the President can make recess appointments during so-called “intra-session recesses” and (2) whether the vacancy must arise during the recess for the President to exercise power under the Recess Appointments Clause. In addition, the Court directed the parties to address a third question raised by Noel Canning: “Whether the President’s recess-appointment power may be exercised when the Senate is convening every three days in pro forma sessions.”

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The Third Circuit and the “Session” of the 18th Century Vermont General Assembly

As mentioned in my prior post, in the course of analyzing the meaning of “recess” in the Recess Appointments Clause, the Third Circuit considered legislative practice at the time of the framing. In looking at the state legislatures prior to 1787, the court found what it viewed as conflicting evidence on whether recesses are limited to intersession breaks.

Some state constitutions, the court noted, clearly indicated that a “recess” and a “session” cannot occur conterminously, thus supporting the intersession recess theory. For example, the Massachusetts and New Hampshire constitutions contain provisions that “make sense only if the legislature is not in ‘session’ when it is ‘in recess.'” Opinion at 48. (This is a point I previously made with respect to the Massachusetts constitution).

On the other hand, the court pointed to instances where the executive branch of a state had (allegedly) interpreted the “recess” to include intra-session breaks. For example, the Vermont constitution granted the executive power to lay embargoes during “the recess of the legislature only.” The Vermont General Assembly, which was meeting in Windsor, adjourned on April 16, 1781, stating that it would next meet on the second Wednesday of June at Bennington. During this adjournment, in May 1781, the Governor of Vermont imposed an embargo.

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